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 Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the existence of price momentum in the Foreign 
Exchange market before and after the Global Financial Crisis, by analysing 
a sample of 18 currency pairs between 2002 and 2013. Using a portfolio 
formation approach, average spot and excess returns are calculated for 
investment horizons ranging from one day to one year. Secondly, this 
paper investigates a possible link between price momentum and the market 
positioning of speculators by using the US Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission’s Commitments of Traders report. The results suggest that 
price momentum in the Foreign Exchange market may be most prevalent 
over shorter time frames of up to one day. The fall in interest rates after the 
Global Financial Crisis has reduce the returns from momentum over longer 
time horizons, with these returns being higher for minor or exotic currency 
pairs. Lastly, changes to the market position of speculators often precedes 
the movements in the exchange rate over the following weeks, suggesting 
that speculator’s actions may be an indicator of price continuations.   
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
Introduction 
Price momentum in financial markets has been the focus of numerous 
studies since the early 1990s, however remains a noted market anomaly 
which cannot be explained by standard finance theory. Empirical research 
has observed the tendency for asset prices that have risen in the past to 
continue to do so into the future, and that asset prices which have 
historically fallen will often decline further. This momentum in price 
changes over time has been found to produce excess risk adjusted returns 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001) and has been observed to varying 
degrees across equity, fixed income, commodity and currency markets.  
There has yet to be a generally accepted explanation for why momentum 
returns exist across asset classes, and why trend following behaviour can 
be profitable while contradicting the standard efficient market hypothesis. 
Some research points towards transaction costs or limitations on short 
selling (Korajczyk & Sadka, 2004), temporary market inefficiency 
(Menkhoff & Taylor, 2007) or behavioural biases including slow 
information diffusion (Jegadeesh & Titman, 2001; Chui, Titman, & Wei, 
2010). However, none of these explanations can account for the extent to 
which returns from momentum investing exist in equity markets, and to 
the greater degree that is observed in currency markets. 
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In the study of asset price momentum, currency or Foreign Exchange (FX) 
markets provide a unique perspective with fewer limitations than the more 
commonly studied equity market. The FX market is the largest financial 
market with daily transaction volume exceeding USD 5.5 trillion per day1, 
providing high levels of liquidity and low transaction costs. Furthermore, 
the lack of limitations on short selling allows for momentum studies on the 
FX market to overcome one of the larger hurdles faced by research into 
price momentum in the equity market.  
With the FX market being dominated by larger sophisticated investors, 
combined with the factors above it becomes much harder to explain the 
persistence of price momentum in the FX market compared to studies 
conducted on equity market momentum, and could potentially expose the 
deeper underlying cause of such a market anomaly.  
While the FX market is yet to attain the same asset class status of bond and 
equity markets, a growing trend is developing amongst industry 
practitioners who support the case for maintaining an asset allocation to 
currencies for a well-diversified portfolio. For example, Deutsche Bank, 
currently the largest FX dealer, has developed a set of tradable currency 
indexes available to the retail investor which aims to strategically exploit 
                                                 
 
1 CLS Bank, July 13 2013. 
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certain aspects of the currency markets, such as the Deutsche Bank 
Currency Harvest Index. This index aims to replicate the popular carry 
trade, buy investing in a basket of high yielding currencies funded by short 
positions in low yielding currencies2.  
The Deutsche Bank Currency Momentum Index is constructed to 
systematically evaluate currency pairs that exhibit long term trending 
behaviour, and generate returns from the price momentum of these pairs. 
After recognising the segmentation of market participants in the FX market 
with some reacting to information slower than others, the Deutsche Bank 
Currency Momentum Index is constructed by ranking the eligible currency 
pairs3 by their 12-month spot rate change against the US dollar, and 
establishing a long (short) position in the three best (worst) performing 
currencies. The portfolio of currencies is equally weighted, and rebalanced 
where necessary on a monthly basis.  
Between 1980 and 2006, the Deutsche Bank Currency Momentum Index 
has delivered an average annual excess return of 3%, with Sharpe ratio of 
0.35 and reasonable return stability over the long term (Figure 1). 
                                                 
 
2 The DB G10 Carry Index employs a dynamic approach by ranking currencies by their 
3-month interest rate each quarter, and establishing long positions in the three highest 
yielding currencies and short positions in the three lowest yielding currencies. 
3 The pool of currencies consists of the EUR, GBP, CHF, JPY, AUD, NZD, CAD, 
NOK, and the SEK. 
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Figure 1 – Deutsche Bank Currency Momentum Index excess returns, 1980 - 2006 
This paper aims to build on the previous research covering price 
momentum in the foreign exchange market by Menkhoff et al (2011). 
Firstly the impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis will be investigated, 
in order to compare any differences in returns from momentum before and 
after this event.  
While momentum returns in the FX market were high through the 1970s 
and 1980s, there was a noted decrease in the early 1990s, especially across 
the major currency pairs such as USD/JPY. The trending behaviour of the 
major currencies in the 1970s and 1980s turned towards a more range 
bound behaviour in the 1990s, reflected by a comparative decrease in the 
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profitability of momentum strategies. While some of this may be due to 
market participants acting to exploit momentum returns through trend 
following strategies (Olson, 2004; Neely, Weller and Ulrich, 2009), the 
macro-economic environment may have played a more important role. For 
example, the Louvre Accord initiated by policymakers in 1987 made an 
attempt to stabilize currencies, impacting the FX market heavily in the 
early 1990s. At the same time the volatility of growth and inflation of 
economies began to significantly decrease, also acting to dampen the larger 
trends in the FX market. 
With the macro-economic environment having such a profound effect on 
the FX market, the actions of Central Banks around the world after the 
2008 global financial crisis may have caused another significant shift 
similar to the early 1990s. With interest rates close to zero, monetary policy 
for the US, UK, Eurozone and Japan has included quantitative easing 
efforts resulting in an expansion of the monetary base. Such efforts result 
in the devaluation of currencies, with comparative levels of easing playing 
a major role in trend generation for exchange rates.  
Secondly, this paper will investigate the existence of price momentum over 
time periods as short as one day. An interesting result from the research by 
Menkhoff et al (2011) was how excess returns from momentum were 
greater over shorter time periods, with the highest returns achieved when 
forming a portfolio based on the exchange rate movements over the prior 
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month, then holding the portfolio for one month. This research extends the 
method used by Menkhoff et al (2011) and applies it to daily and weekly 
exchange rate data. 
The final contribution by this paper is to analyse the role which speculators 
play in driving momentum returns. If momentum returns are largely driven 
by behavioural biases, as observed by Jegadeesh & Titman (2001) and 
Menkhoff et al (2011), the observed momentum returns should be 
correlated with the actions of speculative market participants. From these 
three contributions, this paper will examine where price momentum may 
exist in the foreign exchange market, and what factors may be influencing 
it. 
  
Important Literature 
This section reviews the relevant literature surrounding price momentum 
and its influencing factors. The first section covers research into 
momentum in equity markets, with the second section covering literature 
specifically on currency market price momentum. The third section 
focuses on the 2011 research by Menkhoff et al, which is closely related to 
this paper. The fourth section outlines the studies around positive feedback 
investors and predatory trading which may be factors driving momentum 
returns. The fifth section looks into order flow dynamics and short term 
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momentum, while the last section covers literature relating to the 
usefulness of speculative positioning data such as the Commitments of 
Traders Report. 
Momentum in Equity Markets 
Research into price momentum in financial markets largely stems from the 
work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who showed that excess returns 
from momentum of approximately 1% per month existed in US equity 
markets between 1965 and 1989. Their method of portfolio formation has 
been widely applied in later research, and has been the most common 
method of identifying where momentum may exist from historical prices. 
Subsequent research by Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) and Conrad and Kaul 
(1998) supported the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), showing 
that widespread excess returns from momentum still existed after adjusting 
for transaction costs, and were robust across a range of strategies with 
different investment time spans.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) also noted that momentum returns did not 
persist over extended periods of time, as excess returns after approximately 
twelve months would either turn negative or not be statistically significant 
from zero. In addition, momentum returns existed within sub-samples of 
large cap and small cap stocks, indicating that statistically significant 
returns from momentum were independent of company size. Lee and 
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Swaminathan (2000) also investigated price momentum in the US equity 
market, between 1965 and 1995, and found similar results to Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) with all momentum portfolios producing excess returns 
that were statistically significant from zero, and which displayed a reversal 
in returns over a longer investment horizon. 
Rouwenhorst (1998) expanded the momentum research from US to 
European equities, analysing data from 2,190 companies across 12 
countries between 1980 and 1995. The findings supported those of studies 
on the US market, and also found that statistically significant momentum 
returns existed regardless of the company size. Dijk and Huibers (2002) 
examined momentum across equities in 15 European countries from 1987 
to 1995, and found excess momentum returns existed across all strategies 
implemented, while De Bondt et al. (1999) showed that, at the very least, 
momentum returns would out-perform a passive investment strategy for 
European equities. Research into price momentum in equities in emerging 
markets and across Asia found lower excess returns than in the US equity 
market (Rouwenhorst, 1999; Chui et al. 2000), partly influenced by the 
volatility of momentum returns around the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Price momentum has been suggested to be the results of a market that only 
gradually responds to new information. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 
(1996) investigated why a stock’s prior 6-month return and its most recent 
earnings surprise, both publicly available information, helped to predict 
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the future returns. While price momentum was observed to have a stronger 
and longer-lasting effect than earnings momentum, both produced 
statistically significant momentum in returns for at least a six month 
period. The majority of their evidence was indicative that this price 
momentum was not reversed in the future, so could not be entirely the 
result of positive feedback traders. Chan et al. noted that if the market 
received a piece of news such as earnings that was either above or below 
expectations, on average the following two news announcements also 
surprised in the same direction. Analysts were also slow to respond to 
surprises in news announcements, especially where the announcements 
opposed the current perception for future returns, and would gradually 
revise their forecasts over time. Such evidence supports the idea that price 
momentum may be in part driven by a market that only gradually adjusts 
to new information. It is important to note that Chan et al. found that stocks 
with higher momentum tended to have larger trading costs, being smaller 
less liquid issues.  
Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu (2003) found strong evidence of trades 
following short term historical returns, but with differing behaviour 
between institutional and individual investors. The day after a strong return 
performance, stocks in the top decile of returns were found to be 23.9% 
more likely to be purchased by institutional investors than those in the 
lowest decile, while individual investors were more likely to sell such 
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stocks. As such momentum investing is more prevalent for institutional 
investors compared to individuals it may follow on that the two groups are 
reacting differently to news announcements, where institutional investors 
react to positive news as a buy signal while individual investors see such 
events as a selling opportunity. 
Momentum in Currency Markets 
Studies analysing price momentum in financial markets have been 
dominated by research on equity markets, but is expanding into other asset 
classes including bonds (Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan, 2005; 
Jostova et al, 2010) and commodities (Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst, 
2008), which have shown that the price momentum across different asset 
classes may be driven by common factors. However, research on 
momentum in the foreign exchange (FX) market has usually focused on 
factors such as technical trading rules or the carry trade, with only a fewer 
papers directly addressing the large excess returns seen when employing 
the methods used in equity momentum research. Okunev and White (2003) 
and Bianchi et al. (2004) find that excess returns from momentum in the 
FX market can exceed those seen in equity markets even after adjusting for 
transaction costs, but may be more predominant with emerging market 
currencies  (Neely and Weller, 2011). This is similar to the finding by Chan 
et al. (1996) where price momentum in the equity markets was found to be 
larger amongst smaller, less liquid stocks with larger trading costs. 
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Okunev and White (2003) suggested that momentum in the foreign 
exchange market is derived from two main sources: central bank 
intervention and the presence of noise traders. Noise traders, acting on the 
historical movements of exchange rates contribute a large proportion of the 
liquidity in the foreign exchange market and therefore can have a strong 
influence on the short-term direction of exchange rates. Behavioural 
finance literature has revealed that such traders are also susceptible to 
positive feedback mechanisms which can result in market inefficiencies 
including price momentum. This is driven by the trader’s propensity to 
extrapolate a currency’s current observed appreciation or depreciation into 
their expectations for the short run, creating a bandwagon effect of trend-
following (Malkiel 2003). 
Exchange rate fluctuations exhibit both positive serial correlation and 
mean reversion (Levich 1989, Muga and Santamaría 2007). Technical 
trading rules such as moving averages have been popular amongst traders 
looking to exploit such aspects of exchange rate dynamics in an attempt to 
outperform a buy and hold strategy. Meese and Rogoff (1983) showed that 
macroeconomic fundamentals have a lower explanatory power for 
exchange rate fluctuations than for fluctuations of stock returns, with a 
growing body of literature providing evidence on how order flows are 
heavily related to short-term exchange rate dynamics. Evans and Lyons 
(2002) observed how transaction flows between market participants can 
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explain nominal exchange rate movements ranging from a time period of 
a few minutes up to a couple of months. The influence of order flows is 
also robust across different currency pairs and different methods of 
observing the trading dynamics of market participants (Osler 2008; Rime 
et al. 2010; Sager and Taylor 2008). 
Gómez-González and García-Suaza (2012) applied a probabilistic 
approach for testing the presence of momentum in nominal exchange rates, 
and found evidence of exchange rate inertia. Using eight emerging market 
economy currencies paired with the U.S. dollar (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Hong Kong, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, and Turkey), they applied a logit 
model to test the probability of obtaining a positive (negative) exchange 
rate return given a positive (negative) return in the preceding period. In 
addition, control variables were used to isolate momentum from common 
drivers of exchange rate movements, such as stock market returns and the 
associated volatility index (VIX).  
Their findings supported the existing evidence that exchange rate 
momentum is present within the group of emerging market economies, but 
found an asymmetric presence between exchange rate appreciation and 
exchange rate depreciation. Evidence of momentum was stronger and more 
statistically significant during periods of exchange rate deprecation, 
suggesting that central bank intervention could be an important factor 
contributing to momentum. While many emerging market economies are 
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large exporters of commodities they inherently benefit from having lower 
exchange rates. Hence, during periods of rapid currency appreciation 
central banks may intervene to actively weaken the currency and also 
entice traders to short the currency against the U.S. dollar, resulting in 
momentum from further depreciation in the short term.  
Menkhoff et al, Currency Momentum Strategies (2011) 
One of the most recent and thorough investigations into price momentum 
in the FX market was completed by Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling and 
Schrimpf (2011), who found excess returns of up to 10% per annum after 
an empirical analysis of momentum across 30 exchange rates. 
Furthermore, their study quantitatively differentiated between returns from 
momentum and the returns achieved from the carry trade or by following 
technical trading rules. 
Using Reuters 1-month data of exchange rates between January 1976 and 
January 2010, Menkhoff et al followed a portfolio-formation approach 
similar to the method used in equity market literature and by industry 
practitioners when setting up momentum Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). 
At the end of each month, a ‘long-short’ portfolio constructed by going 
short the six worst performing currency pairs and long the six best-
performing currency pairs would formed, with an analysis being conducted 
on the subsequent return over the holding period. For robustness, 
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Menkhoff et al formed a number of portfolios using a range of formation 
and holding periods, identifying currency pairs to go long and short by 
considering lagged returns over 1,3,6,9 and 12 months and then analysing 
their performance over a 1,3,6,9 and 12 month period.  
The results obtained showed excess returns from momentum existed across 
all portfolio formation and holding periods, with the portfolios with a one 
month holding period providing statistically significant excess returns 
between 6-10% per annum (Figure 2). There was a noted reduction in 
excess returns for portfolios held over longer periods, with shorter holding 
periods outperforming longer holding periods for any given formation 
period. However, the excess returns observed over longer holding periods 
were still statistically significant indicating that momentum in the FX 
market may not be confined to shorter time horizons.  
 
Figure 2:  Cumulative excess returns of momentum strategies for portfolios held for 1 month, and 
formed over 1 month (blue line), 6 months (red line), or 12 months (Black line) –Menkhoff et al 
(2011) 
 23 
 
Different formation periods also impacted on the observed returns from 
momentum, with portfolios constructed over longer formation periods 
resulting in lower excess returns than the portfolios constructed over 
shorter formation periods. For example, Menkhoff et al found returns from 
momentum of 1.81% per annum for a portfolio formed over a twelve 
month period and held for twelve months, while a portfolio with a one 
month formation and holding period produced excess returns of nearly 
10% per annum.  
One important result from Menkhoff et al showed that excess returns from 
momentum from the portfolio formation approach should have been 
exploitable by investors, given that there was stability in returns from a 
strategy that performed well in the past continuing to do so into the future. 
It was rarely the case where a portfolio which produced large excess 
returns in one period would then result in large losses in the following 
periods, indicating that investors should have had an adequate ability to 
identify opportunities arising from momentum and subsequently act on it.  
Menkhoff et al (2011) also compared the returns from momentum to those 
of popular technical trading rules and the carry trade, and found a low 
correlation between the two. Returns from technical trading rules have 
been studied extensively, with moving averages being one of the most 
common in literature relating to the FX market. Often such rules entail 
either 1, 20, 50 or 200 day moving averages where crosses between shorter 
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and longer period averages are used to generate investing signals. For 
example, when the 50-day moving average crosses above the 200 day 
moving average an investor may look to initiate a long position in the asset 
as prices are seen to be rising. Conversely, if the 50-day moving average 
crosses below the 200-day moving average an investor may look to initiate 
a short position. Menkhoff et al computed returns for three moving average 
crossover rules, and compared their excess returns to those of the 
momentum portfolios formed over a 1, 6 and 12 month period and held for 
1 month. Their regression results found the strongest correlation to have 
an R2 value of 26%, with economically and statistically significant 
intercept estimates. From this, Menkhoff et al concluded that while there 
was some correlation between momentum returns and the returns from 
technical trading rules, controlling for returns from a technical trading rule 
such as a moving average crossover would not account for the excess 
returns from momentum that were observed. 
An important aspect of the FX market is the carry trade, where investors 
take a long position in a high yielding currency, and fund it by borrowing 
through a short position in a low yielding currency. Menkhoff et al (2011) 
also investigated to which extent momentum returns were capturing the 
returns from such interest rate differentials which underpinned the carry 
trade, but found that the returns had very little correlation and were 
structurally different to the returns observed from momentum. 
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In comparison to the literature on equity markets there has been little work 
completed on the influence of behavioural effects of investors on currency 
markets. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) presented the idea of slow 
information diffusion leading to an under-reaction by investors, followed 
by a subsequent over-reaction and reversal which acts as the underlying 
driver of momentum returns.  Menkhoff et al (2011) observes a similar 
phenomenon to Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) who identify an ‘inverted U-
shaped pattern’ in returns, where returns from momentum increase over a 
period of several months before dropping off rapidly. Menkhoff et al find 
a clear pattern of returns increasing over the first 8 – 12 months after a 
momentum portfolio is formed, before declining in subsequent months. In 
particular, portfolios with longer formation periods seem to exhibit a more 
pronounced reversal in momentum returns, mirroring the behaviour 
observed in equity markets by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). This result 
suggests that the momentum observed in equity and currency markets may 
both be driven by similar behavioural effects, and that momentum across 
different asset classes may share a common root.  
Positive Feedback Investors and Predatory Trading 
De Long et al (1990) analysed the dynamics of positive feedback investors 
who buy assets when prices rise and sell assets when prices fall, often 
influenced by trend-chasing behaviour or the formation of expectations 
based on the extrapolation of recent price movements. Rational speculators 
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are understood to stabilize asset prices (Friedman, 1953) and dampen 
fluctuations caused by noise traders, however with the presence of positive 
feedback traders such rational speculators may destabilize asset prices and 
induce short term price momentum.  
For example, a positive news announcement could lead rational 
speculators to anticipate further buying from positive feedback traders in 
the market following the price increase of the asset. In order to ‘front run’ 
these traders, rational speculators would be willing to bid up the price of 
the asset beyond what the fundamental news suggests, and sell out at a 
higher price after the positive feedback traders have entered the market. 
From this, price momentum can be induced with a proportion of the price 
increase based on fundamentals with the residual increase from the 
anticipation of positive feedback traders and their actions in the market. 
Such price momentum from positive feedback traders is possible over 
different time horizons, as traders may be acting in response to intraday to 
monthly or quarterly returns. 
De Long et al (1990) notes that front running by investment banks could 
be a common occurrence of this, where information relating customer 
orders can provide insight into the future levels of demand.  
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) discuss the price impacts of predatory 
trading, where the knowledge of one trader’s requirements to urgently exit 
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a position may prompt other traders to front-run the selling and drive down 
prices even further. While this is most pronounced in illiquid markets, such 
behaviour can lead to short term price momentum that ultimately lead to 
more traders being drawn in.  For example, if it is known that one trader 
needs to liquidate a position to avoid a margin call, other traders may also 
sell in advance with the ability to buy back the asset at a lower price. This 
would lead to prices overshooting to the downside in the short term, and 
possibly accelerate the sell-off if more traders are forced to liquidate their 
position from the continued move.  
An example of this occurring in the foreign exchange market came in June 
1995, where Credit General had bought one billion pound sterling for a 
client. As this was an unusually large amount to be executed, market 
participants took note and as Credit General attempted to immediately sell 
the sterling for Deutsche Mark the price of sterling proceeded to fall 
rapidly. Jeffery (2003) notes that the risk management for JP Morgan 
Chase and Deutsche Bank includes dealer exit stress tests, measuring the 
impact of a forced withdrawal by a rival on the bank’s own book.  
Order Flow and Short Term Momentum 
Technical analysis has proved useful in predicting short-term exchange 
rate movements, with potential price momentum being identified by 
various trend analysis techniques (Dooley and Shafer 1984, Levich and 
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Thomas 1993). Osler (2003) analyses the clustering of buy and sell orders 
in currency markets around certain levels, which have shown to lead to 
rapid trend continuation when the price reaches such levels. Pring (1985) 
identifies potential price support zones where there is a high concentration 
of demand for an asset, and resistance zones where there is a high 
concentration of supply. The clustering of orders to buy or sell around 
these levels results in trends having the tendency to reverse at predictable 
support or resistance levels, or in the case of substantial demand (supply), 
rapidly move higher (lower) as the price moves beyond the identified level 
of resistance (supply). Using available data on currency take-profit and 
stop-loss orders from a large foreign exchange dealer between August 
1999 and April 2000, Olser (2003) notes that take-profit orders tend to be 
placed at round numbers, while stop-loss orders are concentrated just 
beyond round numbers. 
The implication for price momentum is that in the case where price moves 
beyond the take-profit orders placed at round numbers, the subsequent 
execution of stop-loss orders can lead to a continuation of the current trend 
in the short term. In addition to this, clustering of orders around previous 
price highs or lows can also lead to further price continuation if the 
exchange rate breaks to a new high or low and triggers further stop loss 
orders. It is also important to note that it is common for many traders to 
only exit or enter a new position if the exchange rate moves above or below 
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a certain level, and remains there at the end of the day. Such orders based 
on the previous day’s closing price have the potential to contribute to 
further trend continuation during the following trading session, and may 
be identified as price momentum. The impact of order clustering and 
momentum driven by stop-loss dominated order flow can be applied across 
a range of time horizons, from intraday price dynamics to weekly or 
monthly exchange rate movements. 
Speculative Positioning & the Commitments of Traders Report 
Wang (2000) provided empirical evidence of the usefulness of the 
Commitments of Traders (COT) report provided by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for forecasting future market 
movements, where trader positioning was used as to represent market 
sentiment. Using weekly data dating from January 1993 to March 2000, 
Wang (2000) focused on six of the most actively traded agricultural futures 
markets including corn, soybeans, soymeal, wheat, cotton, and world 
sugar.  
The results showed that large speculator sentiment was useful as a price-
continuation indicator, and conversely, large hedger sentiment provided a 
contrarian indicator for the agricultural futures markets. Statistically 
significant profits were observed when contracts were bought during times 
when large speculators were extremely bullish and large hedgers were 
 30 
 
extremely bearish, and sold when the large speculators were extremely 
bearish and the large hedgers were extremely bullish.  
The contrarian nature of large hedger sentiment forecasting price reversals 
in the agricultural futures markets is also consistent with the hedging 
pressure theory that dates back to Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939), where 
hedgers that use the futures market to transfer risks they do not wish to 
bear must pay some level of risk premium to the speculators that take on 
the risk. 
Briese (2004) suggested that COT reports provide similar information to 
traders to the insider transaction information reported by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC): “Commercials are typically value buyers. 
When their net buying is near its historical top, it is a tip-off that they think 
bargains are available. When their net position reaches its lower historical 
boundary, it usually means that they think tulip-mania has gripped a 
market” (Briese, 1994, p. 20). 
Sanders, Boris & Manfredo (2004) also investigated the usefulness of the 
COT report, this time focusing on the energy futures market. Their analysis 
employed weekly data for the crude oil, unleaded gasoline, heating oil, and 
natural gas futures contracts between October 1992 and December 1999  
Using Granger causality tests, Sanders, Boris & Manfredo (2004) aimed to 
determine if a relationship between prices and trader positions exited, but 
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found insufficient evidence to suggest that the traders net positioning leads 
market returns and generally did not possess any predictive information. 
However, the results provided consistent evidence that market returns 
Granger caused changes in the positioning of traders. Positive market 
returns resulted in an increase in the net-long position of non-commercial 
(speculative) traders in the subsequent week, along with a decrease in the 
net-long position of commercial (hedging) traders, suggesting that 
speculative traders exhibit a trend following behaviour. This was supported 
by negative market returns being seen to cause commercial traders to 
increase their net-long positions while non-commercial traders decreased 
their net-long position. These findings implied a positive correlation 
between market returns and positions held by non-commercial 
(speculative) traders and a negative correlation between returns and 
commercial (hedging) positions. 
The observed trend-following behaviour of speculators is consistent with 
the findings of Sanders et al. (2000) who analysed the energy futures 
market using sentiment indices.  
The data on trader positioning from the CFTC’s Commitments of Traders 
report was also used by Sanders, Irwin & Merrin (2009) to examine its 
usefulness for predicting agricultural futures returns from 1995 to 2006. 
By analysing ten futures markets of variants of wheat, corn, soybean, lean 
hog, and cattle futures, bivariate Granger causality tests showed very little 
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evidence that traders’ positions were useful in forecasting returns. The 
authors found weak evidence that for some specific markets commercial 
positions would lead returns when viewed over weekly horizons. However, 
their findings clearly showed that trader positions followed returns – non-
commercial traders (speculators) increased their long positions after prices 
rose and vice versa. Such evidence suggests that non-commercial traders 
can act as trend followers in the agricultural futures market.    
Sanders, Irwin & Merrin (2009) noted that usefulness of the CFTC’s 
Commitments of Traders report may be limited in application, due to the 
delay between the time when the positions are recorded on a Tuesday to 
when the COT report is published on a Friday. Speculative positions may 
have an impact on returns when considering periods shorter than a week, 
as Streeter and Tomek (1992) have argued. 
 
Data 
Spot and Forward Rate Data 
Historical price data for the period of July 1, 2002 to June 28, 2013 was 
sourced from Thomson-Reuters (DataStream), and covered 18 currency 
pairs as outlined in Table 1. Chart 1.1 to Chart 1.18 describe how these 
currency pairs fluctuated over the sample period. Daily, weekly and 
monthly observations of the spot exchange rates were collected, along with 
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the concurrent overnight forward, 1-week forward and 1-month forward 
rates, and expressed as the amount of foreign currency per 1 US dollar.  
 
The data series employed was the WM/Reuters benchmark rates, which 
was introduced in 1994 to provide a standardized set of rates to allow for 
a consistent comparison between portfolios valuations or against other 
financial benchmarks. The WM/Reuters benchmark rates are calculated at 
4pm in London (known as the London fix) from a sample of transactions 
that occur 30 seconds either side of the fixing time. During this period, the 
median of the observed bid and offer rates are calculated, with the average 
of these two rates being reported as the benchmark rate. The WM/Reuters 
benchmark rates are of high importance from their use in the valuation of 
financial products, and can often be used by banks as an agreed upon rate 
for which a client’s transaction will occur. 
 
Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf (2011) also used data the 
WM/Reuters data, but along with a Barclays Bank International (BBI) 
dataset had monthly spot and forward rate data from 1976 to 2010. Over 
this period, up to 48 different currency pairs were included in their analysis 
with the sample size changing depending on which currencies were being 
traded at the time. In comparison, the dataset in this paper has a consistent 
sample size with the same number of currencies being analysed from 2002 
through to 2013. The 18 currency pairs analysed is smaller than the cross 
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section of currencies in Menkhoff et al (2011), but represent a wide range 
of geographic locations and different economies such as those from 
developed and emerging markets.     
 
Commitments of Traders Data 
Data relating to the speculative positioning of US FX Futures traders was 
sourced from the historical weekly Commitments of Traders (COT) reports 
published on the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CTFC) 
website. 
Using data from the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CTFC), the Commitments of Traders (COT) reports provide a weekly 
breakdown of the open interest and net positioning of US futures market 
participants.  A report is released each Friday at 3:30pm EST, reflecting 
the commitments of traders for the previous Tuesday. An important feature 
of the COT report is the ability to separate positioning of commercial and 
non-commercial (speculative) market participants. When registering with 
the CTFC, traders are classified as ‘commercial’ if the trader uses futures 
contracts for hedging purposes as defined in CFTC Regulations4. From 
                                                 
 
4 CTFC Regulation 1.3(z), 17 CFR 1.3(z). 
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this, all the open interest of commercial positioning is backed by a holding 
of the underlying asset, with trader’s use of futures being constantly 
monitored by the CTFC. Non-commercial positioning represents the 
contracts held by large speculators, mainly hedge funds and banks trading 
currency futures with the intention of closing out their position at a profit, 
before the contract becomes due.  
The Commitments of Traders reports provides weekly data on speculative 
positioning for eight currency pairs (Table 1) for the period of July 10, 
2006 to June 24, 2013. While a wide range of positioning data is available, 
this paper uses the number of outstanding contracts for long and short 
positions in currency versus the US dollar that are held by non-commercial 
(speculative) traders on the previous Tuesday. The level of open interest, 
as well as the net position for the different trader classifications are 
presented in Chart 2.1 to Chart 2.8 along with the respective exchange rate.  
 
Methodology 
This section outlines the method to calculate returns from price momentum 
over various time horizons, and how the Commitments of Traders report 
is used to incorporate information on speculative positioning. The first 
section outlines the portfolio formation approach using daily exchange rate 
data. The second sections extends the analysis to weekly and monthly 
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exchange rate data, and explains the subsequent adjustments that are made 
to the method. The third section outlines how the sample of currency pairs 
is split into majors and minors & exotics, while the final section explains 
how spot and excess returns are regressed on lagged changes to the levels 
of speculative open interest.  
Price Momentum: One to Five Days 
To investigate price momentum in the foreign exchange market, a method 
of portfolio formation will be used, similar to that of Menkhoff et al (2011). 
A US Dollar-neutral portfolio comprising of long and short positions of 
equal number of currency pairs will be constructed, based on the historical 
returns of the currency pairs over a given formation period. This portfolio 
will then be invested for a given holding period, where its return will be 
recorded.  
 
In order to compare price momentum before and after the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), the dataset of exchange rates will be split into three time 
periods. First, a holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007 will 
be extracted to represent the GFC. From this, we are left with a pre-GFC 
period of 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007 and a post-GFC period of 1 January 
2008 to 28 June 2013. Annualized returns for the momentum portfolios 
will be compared between the pre-GFC period, the post-GFC period and 
for the entire dataset (1 June 2002 to 28 June 2013). 
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From the exchange rate data (denoted as foreign currency units per 1 
USD), daily spot and excess returns are calculated as: 
 
Spot Return (r) for holding a long position foreign currency X: 
𝑟𝑡+1
𝑋 = 𝑠𝑡
𝑋 − 𝑠𝑡+1
𝑋  
 
Excess Return (R) for holding a long position foreign currency X: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑋 = 𝑓𝑡
𝑋 − 𝑠𝑡+1
𝑋  
Given that: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑋 ≡ 𝑖𝑡
𝑋 − 𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑠𝑡+1
𝑋 ≈ 𝑓𝑡
𝑋 − 𝑠𝑡+1
𝑋  
 
where s and f denote the log spot and 1-day forward rate respectively. 𝑖𝑡
𝑋 
represents the interest rate of the foreign currency at time t, while 𝑖𝑡 
represents the domestic interest rate at time t. The log spot rate change or 
return over the period is given as ∆𝑠. Following this, returns for short 
positions in the foreign currency are calculated as: 
 
Spot Return (r) for holding a short position foreign currency X: 
𝑟𝑡+1
𝑋 = −𝑠𝑡
𝑋 + 𝑠𝑡+1
𝑋  
 
Excess Return (R) for holding a short position foreign currency X: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑋 = −𝑓𝑡
𝑋 + 𝑠𝑡+1
𝑋  
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At the end of each day, the return (spot and excess) for every currency pair 
over a certain formation period (p) is calculated, and then ranked from 
highest to lowest according to their performance versus the US dollar. For 
the analysis of price momentum using daily exchange rate data, we 
consider formation periods ranging from one to five days, where: 
 
p = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
 
For example, a formation period of p=1 will rank the currencies based on 
their returns over the previous day, while a formation period of p=4 will 
rank the currencies based on their previous four day return. 
 
Once the ranking has been established, an equally weighted US Dollar-
neutral portfolio of currencies is formed, by taking long positions in the n 
best performing currencies and a short position in the n worst performing 
currencies, where: 
 
n = {1, 2, 3} 
 
This portfolio is then invested for a give holding period (q), which similar 
to the formation period ranges from one to five days: 
 
q = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
 39 
 
The total number of different portfolio combinations that are analysed is 
therefore 75, given that there are five different formation and holding 
periods, each with portfolios that are long and short one to three currency 
pairs. 
 
 
 
.  
 
 
The holding period returns for all similar portfolios constructed with the 
same p, q, and n are then averaged and annualized, covering the pre-GFC 
period, post-GFC period and entire dataset. 
 
Weekly & Monthly Price Momentum 
To examine price momentum over greater time horizons the same portfolio 
formation approach is applied, this time using weekly and monthly 
exchange rate data. The pre-GFC and post-GFC periods remain the same 
as in the analysis of the daily exchange rate data. 
Formation Period (p) Holding Period (q) 
t -p t t+q 
  
Currencies ranked and a portfolio long and 
short n pairs is constructed 
Figure 3 Timeline of portfolio formation, construction and investment. 
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For the analysis of weekly exchange rate data, the portfolio formation (p) 
and holding (q) periods now range from one to five weeks each, with the 
portfolios once again containing long and short positions in one to three 
currency pairs (n):  
p = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
q = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
n = {1, 2, 3} 
 
An analysis of price momentum using weekly data would require a 
portfolio to be formed every week on a rolling basis. For example, if the 
portfolio had p = 2, q = 3 and n = 1, it would take a long position in the 
best performing currency and a short position in the worst performing 
currency based on the previous two weeks returns, and report how the 
portfolio performed over the next three weeks. The returns from all similar 
portfolios with p = 2, q = 3 and n = 1 formed over the sample period are 
then averaged and annualized. 
 
At the monthly level, the portfolio formation (p) and holding periods (q) 
will range from one to twelve months, while the number of long and short 
positions of currency pairs in a portfolio remains as one to three: 
p = {1, 3, 6, 9, 12} 
q = {1, 3, 6, 9, 12} 
n = {1, 2, 3} 
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Major Currency Pairs vs. Minors & Exotics 
Neely & Weller (2011) found price momentum to be more predominant 
with emerging market currencies than for the major currency pairs. To 
allow for a comparison in this analysis, the dataset of currency pairs is 
divided into the major currency pairs, including commodity currencies, 
and minors or exotics which are traded in much lower volumes. A full list 
of the sample of currencies that falls into each of these two categories can 
be found in Table 2. 
For each of the samples of currency pairs, spot and excess returns are 
calculated using the same portfolio formation approach as before on daily, 
weekly and monthly exchange rate data. For all of the time horizons, the 
set of formation (p) and holding (q) periods as well as the number of long 
and short positions of currency pairs (n) in a portfolio is kept consistent to 
allow for a comparison to the full sample of currency pairs. 
Speculators & Price Momentum 
The last step in the analysis of price momentum is to investigate the 
relationship between movements in the exchange rate and the actions of 
speculative investors. To do this, weekly spot and excess returns will be 
regressed against lagged changes to the quantity of contracts outstanding 
that represent the open interest of speculative market participants from the 
weekly COT report. 
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This analysis is conducted using both spot and excess returns calculated 
based on formation periods ranging from one to five weeks, similar to the 
portfolio construction method. The number of contracts outstanding that 
represent the open interest each week are separated into speculative long 
positions and speculative short positions. Weekly changes to the number 
of contracts held by speculators long and short are lagged from one to five 
weeks, and each regressed against the returns of different formation 
periods. For all of the regressions Newey-West standard errors are 
calculated with a lag length of two.   
Following the previous analysis of price momentum, the sample is also 
divided into a pre-GFC period of 10 July 2006 to 31 May 2007 and a post-
GFC period of 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013 for comparison.  
 
Results 
The results are split into four sections. The first section covers the average 
spot and excess returns from the daily momentum portfolios, and the 
differences before and after the GFC. Also, this section examines the 
results observed across various portfolio formation and holding periods, 
and for the portfolios containing different numbers of currency pairs. The 
second section summarises the returns of the weekly and monthly 
momentum portfolios, and the third section reports the portfolio returns 
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after dividing the sample of currencies into two groups. The final section 
contains the regression results examining the relationship between 
portfolio returns and the COT report.  
 
Daily Price Momentum 
The average annualized returns for the momentum portfolios constructed 
using daily exchange rate data are summarised in Table 3.1 (excess returns) 
and Table 3.2 (spot returns). Overall, the results show that returns from 
price momentum decrease as the formation or holding periods increase 
from one to five days. An average annual excess return of 5.58% is found 
for a portfolio long and short one currency pair over the whole sample 
period, with a formation and holding period of one day. As the formation 
period for such a portfolio increases to five days, the average excess return 
falls to -3.17%. Likewise, as the holding period increases from one to five 
days, the average excess returns falls to -0.61%. Increasing the number of 
currency pairs held in a portfolio often reduces the average excess return, 
especially for portfolios constructed with shorter formation and holding 
periods. For example, when looking at the whole sample period the 
average excess return for a portfolio with a formation and holding period 
of one day falls from 5.58% to 3.66% when the number of currency pairs 
held in the portfolio rises from one to three.  
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Excess returns from momentum were generally higher before the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) than after. A portfolio long and short one currency 
pair constructed with a formation and holding period of one day had an 
average excess return of 6.79% before the GFC period compared to 4.32% 
after. For the portfolios that performed poorly before the GFC, their 
performance after the GFC often suffered to a greater extent.  
There is a distinct outperformance from portfolios constructed with a 
formation and holding period of one day. As the formation and holding 
periods increase, average excess returns quickly drop to become closer to 
zero or even turn negative. This is an important result to note, as it may 
indicate that momentum returns are being limited to shorter time frames. 
This observation is robust across the pre-GFC, post-GFC and whole 
sample periods, and for portfolios containing different numbers of 
currency pairs. 
Table 3.2 summarises the spot returns for portfolios constructed using 
daily exchange rate data. Compared to the excess returns, the common 
themes remain the same: portfolios constructed with shorter formation and 
holding periods and fewer currency pairs tend to outperform, with spot 
returns decreasing after the GFC. Once again, portfolios constructed with 
a formation and holding period of one day stand out with the largest 
positive returns. Portfolios with high excess returns tended to also have 
even higher spot returns, while those with low or negative excess returns 
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had even lower spot returns. For example, when considering the whole 
sample period a portfolio long and short one currency pair constructed with 
a formation and holding period of one day had an average excess return of 
5.58%, but an average spot return of 6.95%. A similar portfolio with a 
holding period of five days had an average excess return of -3.17% but an 
average spot return of -4.55%.  
Weekly & Monthly Price Momentum 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 summarise the average excess returns and average spot 
returns for portfolios constructed using weekly exchange rate data. Over 
the whole sample period, the average excess returns from price momentum 
were close to zero for portfolios with a formation and holding period of 
one to five weeks. For these time horizons, the number of currency pairs 
held in a portfolio did not greatly influence the excess returns. In contrast 
to the daily momentum portfolios, the portfolios with the shorter formation 
and holding periods of one week appeared to be the worst performers over 
the whole sample period.  
At the weekly level, there is a clear distinction between average excess 
returns before and after the GFC. Table 3.3 highlights how all but one 
portfolio before the GFC had a positive average excess return, while after 
the GFC every portfolio recorded a negative average excess return. Table 
3.4 outlines the spot rate returns for the weekly momentum portfolios. For 
the whole sample period, average spot returns were generally lower than 
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their corresponding average excess returns especially for longer formation 
and holding periods. However, the resounding difference can be seen when 
comparing average spot returns and average excess returns for the period 
before the GFC. While all but one portfolio had a positive excess return 
before the GFC, most of these portfolios had a negative average spot 
returns. This result highlights the influence which interest rate differentials 
have on momentum portfolio returns when portfolios are invested over a 
period of one to five weeks. 
The average excess returns for monthly momentum portfolios are 
summarised in Table 3.5. For the whole sample period, the average excess 
returns once again close to zero, with the portfolios constructed with 
shorter formation periods having slightly positive excess returns that turn 
slightly negative as the formation period increases. The interesting result 
once again comes when comparing pre-GFC and post-GFC excess returns. 
Similar to the weekly momentum portfolios, all but one performs worse 
with a lower average excess return after the GFC with most turning from 
positive to negative. Table 3.6 summarises the average spot rate returns for 
the monthly momentum portfolios, and has a similar theme to the spot 
returns of the weekly momentum portfolios. The positive excess returns in 
the period before the GFC are almost all negative when considering only 
pure spot rate changes.  
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The results of the weekly and monthly momentum portfolios shows how 
returns from price momentum have fallen after the GFC, and how price 
momentum for portfolios invested over these longer time horizons are 
largely influenced by interest rate differentials. 
Majors vs. Minors & Exotics 
The results from repeating the analysis after splitting the sample of 
currency pairs between ‘majors’ and ‘minors & exotics’ are contained in 
Table 4.1 through to Table 4.12.  
Tables 4.1 and Table 4.2 summarise the annual excess return for daily 
momentum portfolios consisting of major currency pairs and minors & 
exotics respectively. When considering the whole sample period from 
2002 to 2013, there is little difference between portfolios constructed of 
only major currency pairs and those constructed of minors & exotics. For 
both samples, the best performing portfolios are those with lower 
formation and holding periods.  
However, when considering the periods before and after the GFC, 
distinctions between the majors and minors & exotics start to emerge. 
Before the GFC, portfolios of only major currency pairs had a higher 
average excess return, especially for lower formation and holding periods. 
For example, a portfolio holding a long and short position in one of the 
major currency pairs constructed from a formation and holding period of 
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one day would yield an average excess return of 5.73%. A similar portfolio 
constructed from only minors & exotics would have an average excess 
return of 4.51%. When considering the sample period after the GFC these 
results are reversed, with portfolios of minors & exotics outperforming 
their related portfolios of major currency pairs. This difference is also 
highlighted to a greater extent as the number of currency pairs held in a 
portfolio increases, where the difference in average excess returns between 
similar portfolios of majors and minors & exotics can rise to more than 
4.5%. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 provide a similar summary, this time using 
spot returns instead of excess returns.  
A summary of excess returns and spot returns for weekly momentum 
portfolios is included from Table 4.5 to Table 4.8. For the whole sample 
period, spot returns and excess returns are generally higher for portfolios 
consisting of only minor & exotic currency pairs compared to those limited 
to major currency pairs. The greatest contract can be seen from the returns 
in the period before the GFC, where all portfolios of minor & exotic 
currency pairs have a positive average excess return while all portfolios 
consisting of major currencies have a negative excess return. The 
difference between these portfolios can reach close to 10%. For example, 
a portfolio during that time which is long and short one minor or exotic 
currency pair, with a formation period of two weeks and a holding period 
of one week, has an average excess return of 7.15%. A similar portfolio 
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restricted to only major currency pairs would however have an average 
excess return of -2.36%. This result is likely to be due to the economies of 
minor & exotic currency pairs generally having higher interest rates, as the 
previous results have shown how average returns to weekly momentum 
portfolios are influenced by interest rate differentials. Average spot returns 
for the weekly momentum portfolios are summarised in Table 4.7 and 
Table 4.8. 
Finally, the excess and spot returns of monthly momentum portfolios are 
summarised in Table 4.9 through to 4.12. Over the whole sample period, 
the average excess and spot returns for portfolios constructed with only 
major currency pairs tend to slightly outperform, especially for longer 
formation and holding periods. However, when the average excess returns 
are compared across the periods before and after the GFC the results are 
mixed. Prior to the GFC, momentum portfolios constructed from minor & 
exotic currency pairs outperformed those constructed from only the major 
currencies. After the GFC this result is reversed, with the portfolios 
constructed from minor & exotic currencies this time underperforming. 
This result again shows how changes in interest rate differentials before 
and after the GFC can impact the performance of momentum portfolios, 
with minor & exotic currency pairs whose interest rates are generally 
higher having a greater exposure to this factor. 
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Speculative Positioning & Price Momentum 
The results after regressing excess and spot returns on lagged changes to 
the level of speculative open interest (quantity of long and short futures 
outstanding) are summarised in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. There is a close 
similarity between the estimates for the regressions using excess returns 
and spot returns, resulting negligible changes to the level of significance 
between the two results. This is due to the differences between excess and 
spot returns being small in comparison to the changes in the quantities of 
contracts outstanding, which are of a greater order of magnitude.  
There are mixed levels of significance for results when considering all 
formation periods for returns and all lag lengths of changes to the level 
open interest. However, when considering only those estimates that are 
significant at the 1% level (denoted by a **), it is commonly found that 
increases (decreases) in the quantity of long (short) contracts are followed 
by a positive excess return for the currency pair in the follow weeks. These 
regressions suggest that when speculative investors are increasing long 
(short) positions in a currency pair, prices tend to be increasing 
(decreasing) in the following weeks.  
The most significant results tend to come from regressions with shorter lag 
lengths of changes to open interest levels, and for those with longer 
formation periods of returns. Secondly, after the GFC the relationship 
between lagged changes in open interest and excess or spot returns may 
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have strengthened, with the coefficient estimates becoming more 
significant that prior to the GFC. 
Conclusion 
Returns from price momentum in the foreign exchange market are more 
predominant over shorter time periods. As the results have shown, there is 
a clear distinction for higher average returns for portfolios with a formation 
and holding period of one day. This result is an extension of the finding by 
Menkhoff et al (2011), who observed the highest returns from momentum 
to come from the portfolios with the shortest formation and holding periods 
in their analysis.   
This result suggests that the key drivers of price momentum can be derived 
from short term influences. Even after dividing the sample of currencies 
into majors and minors & exotics, and comparing the periods before and 
after the Global Financial Crisis, the result remains that there is something 
unique driving short term price momentum. This phenomenon could be 
caused by noise traders, as suggested by Okunev and White (2003) and 
(Malkiel 2003), where they are forming expectations based on 
extrapolating past price changes and therefore inducing some short term 
momentum into the exchange rates. Order flow influences, such as those 
described by Osler (2003) could also be contributing to these short term 
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returns as well as the behaviour of rational speculators who are looking to 
‘front run’ positive feedback traders (De Long et al, 1990).  
With the foreign exchange market being open 24 hours a day from Sunday 
evening to Friday afternoon5, there could be a degree of slow information 
diffusion from news releases that spill over from one trading session to the 
next. This explanation is in line with the theory put forward by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001) relating to slow information diffusion in equity 
markets. It is likely that there are a range of short term factors which are 
combining to produce the distinct returns from portfolios with a formation 
and holding period of one day, which presents an interesting foundation 
for future research.  
Secondly, the results showed how interest rate differentials can impact the 
returns of longer term momentum portfolios, specifically those constructed 
with an investment horizon spanning from weeks to months. After dividing 
the sample into periods before and after the GFC, it is clear that returns 
longer term momentum in the foreign exchange market relies on interest 
rate differentials more than the influences noted for the daily portfolios. 
The results also show how these momentum returns are more commonly 
                                                 
 
5 US time. Trading occurs 24 hours a day from Monday morning in New Zealand 
through Friday night in New York 
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found in the minor or exotic currency pairs. Weekly and monthly 
momentum portfolios performed better when they were constructed using 
only minor and exotic currency pairs, which supports the findings of Neely 
and Weller (2011) who found price momentum to be more predominant 
with emerging market currencies on these time horizons.     
Lastly, the speculative positioning data from the Commitments of Traders 
(COT) report shows a link between the actions of those traders and the 
future exchange rate movements. With the timing limitations of the data in 
the COT report, it is hard form theories on causation unless a more frequent 
dataset can be obtained. However, speculators in the foreign exchange 
market increase their long positions in a currency prior to periods of 
positive returns, and vice versa. This result is similar to the finding of 
Wang (2000) who noted the same speculator sentiment to be a useful price 
continuation indicator in the agricultural futures markets.  
Future Research 
The results from this paper open the door for a number of future research 
opportunities. The first of which should be to investigate price momentum 
in the foreign exchange market over shorter time horizons. Given the 
outperformance of momentum portfolios with a formation and holding 
period of one day, it would be interesting to see if these returns are larger 
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when considering intra-day returns that might come from using hourly 
observations of the exchange rates. 
Such intra-day momentum could be concentrated around the open or close 
of key markets, such as when the US, European or Asian trading sessions 
commence. If slow information diffusion is a key driver of short term 
momentum, then any exchange rate movements from a news release in one 
trading session might continue at the start of the next as new traders enter 
the market. An extension of this would be to investigate the impact that 
liquidity has on momentum returns. This could be done by comparing price 
momentum between quiet periods, such as the time between the US session 
ending and the Asian session starting, and the busier trading sessions such 
as when both the US and European markets are active.  
To assess the practicality of acting on this short term price momentum, it 
will be important to incorporate some form of risk management into the 
analysis. Furthermore, filter rules could be applied based on popular 
technical analysis methods to assess if this improves the performance of 
momentum return portfolios. If the short term price momentum is a result 
of noise traders or positive feedback traders, then incorporating some of 
the popular technical analysis tools (such as moving averages) which they 
pay the most attention to can help to define exactly when this price 
momentum exists and increase the average returns for portfolios.  
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Next, further analysis could be conducted to assess the possibility of a 
reversal in momentum over short and longer time horizons. This 
phenomenon has been popular in previous research (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993; Lee and Swaminathan, 2000). The current portfolio 
formation approach does not adequately identify if a certain portfolio 
initially outperforms during the holding period, only to have returns turn 
negative during the latter portion. Such an effect can result from a currency 
pair exhibiting some degree of mean reversion, and may have a more 
profound influence momentum returns over longer time horizons.  
Lastly, if a more frequent and timely dataset of speculative trader 
positioning becomes available, it can be used to investigate a possible 
causation link between the trading behaviour of speculators and price 
movements in the underlying asset.  While this paper has shown that price 
momentum does exist in parts of the foreign exchange market, there 
remains more to be investigated, such as the extent to which behavioural 
biases play in driving this market anomaly.  
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Tables & Charts 
Table 1: Sample of Currency Pairs  
 
Spot & Forward Rate Data 
 
Australian Dollar (AUD) 
British Pound (GBP) 
Canadian Dollar (CAD) 
Czech Koruna (CZK) 
Danish Krone (DKK) 
Euro (EUR) 
Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) 
Hungarian Forint (HUF) 
Japanese Yen (JPY) 
Mexican Peso (MXN) 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD) 
Norwegian Krone (NOK) 
Polish Zloty (PLN) 
Singapore Dollar (SGD) 
South African Rand (ZAR)  
Swedish Krona (SEK) 
Swiss Franc (CHF) 
Turkish Lira (TRY) 
 
Speculative Positioning Data 
 
Australian Dollar (AUD) 
British Pound (GBP) 
Canadian Dollar (CAD) 
Euro (EUR) 
Japanese Yen (JPY) 
Mexican Peso (MXN) 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD) 
Swiss Franc (CHF)
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Table 2: Currency Pairs: Majors vs. Minors & Exotics  
 
Majors 
 
Australian Dollar (AUD) 
British Pound (GBP) 
Canadian Dollar (CAD) 
Euro (EUR) 
Japanese Yen (JPY) 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD) 
Swiss Franc (CHF) 
 
 
 
 
Minors & Exotics  
 
Mexican Peso (MXN) 
Norwegian Krone (NOK) 
Polish Zloty (PLN) 
Singapore Dollar (SGD) 
South African Rand (ZAR)  
Swedish Krona (SEK) 
Turkish Lira (TRY) 
Czech Koruna (CZK) 
Danish Krone (DKK)  
Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) 
Hungarian Forint (HUF) 
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Table 3.1: Daily Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Excess Return
 
 
Daily Portfolio - Annualized Percentage Excess Return
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 6.79 3.49 -2.96 -4.07 -1.93 1 4.32 1.52 1 -3.87 -5.62 1 5.58 2.41 -0.16 -3.3 -3.17
2 1.61 1.26 -4.66 -3.86 -2.58 2 1.34 -0.71 -2.55 -3.59 -4.02 2 1.42 0.33 -2.97 -3.66 -3
3 -0.25 -1.17 -3.82 -2.93 -1 3 0.38 -1.75 -2.9 -3.16 -4.01 3 -0.06 -1.36 -3.05 -3.17 -2.54
4 -1.41 -1.15 -3.16 -1 0.29 4 -0.73 -2.79 -4.05 -3.75 -3.41 4 -1 -2.09 -3.35 -2.77 -1.66
5 -0.33 -0.68 -2 -0.54 1.34 5 -0.97 -3.29 -3.22 -2.94 -3.22 5 -0.61 -2.16 -2.63 -2.03 -1.06
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 6.18 1.05 -1.46 -2.15 -0.88 1 3.93 1.69 1.83 -1.93 -3.99 1 5.13 1.87 0.56 -1.61 -2.27
2 1.38 -0.99 -3.35 -2.97 -0.78 2 0.51 -1.15 -0.69 -3.37 -3.85 2 1.06 -0.66 -1.62 -3.01 -2.23
3 -1.03 -2.28 -3.39 -2.24 -0.34 3 -0.64 -1.92 -2.71 -3.56 -3.33 3 -0.81 -1.79 -2.9 -2.87 -1.94
4 -1.06 -1.4 -2.04 -1.15 0.86 4 -1.24 -2.92 -3.44 -3.04 -3.27 4 -0.92 -2.05 -2.71 -2.21 -1.38
5 -0.76 -0.86 -0.92 -0.46 1.38 5 -1.75 -3.25 -2.55 -2.45 -2.97 5 -1.12 -2.01 -1.89 -1.62 -1
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 3.39 0.71 -1.04 -1.97 -1.23 1 3.65 1.39 1.48 -1.03 -2.41 1 3.66 1.56 0.73 -1.02 -1.64
2 0.14 -2.32 -2.52 -2.76 -0.98 2 0.67 -0.56 -0.35 -2.79 -3.42 2 0.64 -0.93 -1.03 -2.64 -2.22
3 -1.52 -2.45 -2.46 -1.85 -0.89 3 0.08 -1.12 -2.67 -3.19 -3.18 3 -0.59 -1.44 -2.4 -2.54 -2.18
4 -1.26 -1.8 -1.46 -1.07 0.12 4 -0.9 -2.35 -3.56 -3.08 -2.89 4 -0.9 -1.92 -2.46 -2.13 -1.54
5 -0.71 -1.06 -0.7 -0.32 0.57 5 -1.58 -2.64 -3.05 -2.55 -2.52 5 -1.07 -1.77 -1.96 -1.58 -1.17
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 3.2: Daily Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Spot Return 
 
 
Daily Portfolio - Annualized Percentage Spot Return
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 7.89 3.52 -3.13 -4.79 -2.82 1 5.96 1.06 -0.38 -3.03 -7.17 1 6.95 2.26 -0.96 -3.07 -4.55
2 3.19 0.77 -4.21 -4.87 -2.76 2 2.59 -1.46 -3.42 -3.23 -5.64 2 2.78 -0.12 -3.27 -3.95 -3.98
3 0.7 -1.8 -3.57 -2.97 -0.23 3 1.54 -2.52 -3.98 -3.21 -5.63 3 1.08 -2.01 -3.61 -3.21 -3.11
4 -0.71 -1.59 -2.54 -1.5 0.92 4 0.67 -3.27 -5.17 -3.72 -5.19 4 0.12 -2.44 -3.72 -2.98 -2.38
5 0.12 -1.01 -1.56 -0.68 1.67 5 0.14 -3.82 -4.47 -2.96 -4.42 5 0.24 -2.47 -3.12 -2.17 -1.63
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 7.23 1.03 -1.29 -2.01 0 1 5.46 2.15 0.68 -2.33 -5.76 1 6.45 2.15 0.21 -1.68 -2.72
2 2.62 -1.35 -2.94 -3.16 -0.04 2 1.84 -0.76 -1.42 -3.66 -5.09 2 2.39 -0.55 -1.68 -3.35 -2.55
3 0.12 -2.8 -2.82 -2.08 0.19 3 0.68 -1.81 -3.36 -3.87 -4.46 3 0.46 -1.93 -2.89 -3.06 -2.24
4 -0.14 -1.75 -1.61 -1.14 1.38 4 -0.22 -2.9 -4.17 -3.61 -4.25 4 0.05 -2.17 -2.8 -2.56 -1.6
5 -0.06 -1.04 -0.63 -0.51 1.74 5 -0.93 -3.27 -3.4 -3.1 -3.87 5 -0.33 -2.1 -2.1 -2.03 -1.25
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 5.07 0.3 -1.03 -2.21 -0.26 1 4.96 1.35 0.62 -1.31 -2.81 1 5.15 1.38 0.31 -1.29 -1.34
2 1.42 -2.57 -2.6 -3.01 -0.26 2 1.94 -0.9 -0.97 -3.12 -4.11 2 1.91 -1.16 -1.34 -2.96 -2.19
3 -0.56 -2.84 -2.4 -1.87 0.07 3 1.11 -1.24 -3.01 -3.61 -3.9 3 0.42 -1.62 -2.52 -2.76 -2.1
4 -0.21 -2.05 -1.4 -0.97 0.83 4 0.01 -2.43 -3.92 -3.58 -3.62 4 0.03 -2.03 -2.59 -2.33 -1.63
5 0.1 -1.2 -0.61 -0.35 1.05 5 -0.97 -2.88 -3.37 -3.13 -3.21 5 -0.36 -1.9 -2.07 -1.89 -1.32
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 3.3: Weekly Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Excess Return 
 
 
Weekly Portfolio - Annualized Percentage Excess Return
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.55 1.68 3.18 1.48 2.67 1 -10.28 -6.93 -1.02 -3.74 -2.4 1 -5.73 -3.68 0.85 -1.16 -0.48
2 1.51 1.06 2.93 2.25 3.37 2 -5.79 -3.61 -0.44 -4.1 -3.18 2 -2.45 -1.02 1.03 -1.07 -0.41
3 0.97 2.16 3.84 2.97 3.25 3 -4.08 -1.52 -0.55 -3.87 -2.78 3 -1.62 0.19 1.41 -0.82 -0.58
4 2.25 2.84 3.12 2.61 2.29 4 -3.1 -2.59 -2.68 -4.5 -1.44 4 -0.86 -0.38 -0.29 -1.83 -0.54
5 2.15 2.01 2.29 1.4 2.5 5 -4.37 -1.82 -2.06 -3.23 -1.35 5 -1.48 -0.22 -0.5 -1.4 -0.19
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.9 3.24 2.12 3.98 2.17 1 -5.09 -5.26 -1.72 -1 -0.98 1 -2.67 -1.87 0.07 0.78 0.24
2 1.37 1.69 3.6 3.82 2.57 2 -3.46 -3.17 -0.67 -1.51 -1.35 2 -1.37 -0.71 1.38 0.82 0.21
3 0.62 2.15 3.39 3.01 1.91 3 -2.01 -1.44 -0.54 -1.73 -1.35 3 -0.69 0.2 1.15 0.18 -0.35
4 0.67 2.7 2.95 2.6 1.71 4 -1.55 -2.04 -1.34 -2.25 -0.49 4 -0.72 -0.16 0.24 -0.58 -0.04
5 0.53 2.29 2.03 2.32 1.65 5 -2.43 -2.23 -1.28 -1.97 -0.47 5 -1.11 -0.39 -0.2 -0.34 0.05
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 1.57 2.18 1.53 2.43 2.15 1 -4.6 -4.18 -0.44 0.31 -0.28 1 -2.26 -1.55 0.46 0.84 0.37
2 1.9 1.6 2.22 2.92 1.33 2 -3.14 -1.72 -0.54 -0.03 -0.7 2 -0.94 -0.03 0.8 1.21 -0.04
3 1.21 1.95 1.76 1.87 0.87 3 -1.72 -0.9 -0.28 -0.55 -0.88 3 -0.25 0.38 0.66 0.31 -0.53
4 1.16 2 1.43 1.87 0.88 4 -0.9 -1.11 -0.93 -0.97 -0.52 4 -0.13 0.06 -0.09 -0.18 -0.4
5 0.89 1.8 1.01 1.72 0.59 5 -1.48 -1.1 -1.05 -0.58 -0.38 5 -0.43 0.01 -0.38 0.07 -0.31
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 3.4: Weekly Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Spot Return 
 
 
Weekly Portfolio - Annualized Percentage Spot Return
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -1.51 -2.24 -1.95 -2.39 -1.5 1 -8.64 -5.4 -1.42 -3.29 -2.04 1 -5.53 -4.34 -1.61 -3.13 -1.93
2 -0.02 -3 -0.45 -0.7 -1.17 2 -6.66 -2.98 -0.7 -2.62 -2.15 2 -3.77 -2.47 -0.52 -1.74 -1.88
3 -0.99 -2 -0.01 -0.58 -1.16 3 -3.94 -1.34 -0.34 -2.8 -2.15 3 -2.54 -1.57 -0.23 -1.92 -2.25
4 -0.18 -0.6 -0.09 -0.35 -1.71 4 -3.18 -2.02 -2.17 -3.62 -1.02 4 -2.09 -1.67 -1.6 -2.78 -1.97
5 -0.4 -0.96 -0.79 -0.97 -1.53 5 -4.68 -1.76 -1.93 -2.62 -0.9 5 -2.86 -1.55 -1.86 -2.14 -1.77
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -1.34 -0.82 -0.38 -1.09 -0.65 1 -5.04 -4.37 -1.22 -1 -0.97 1 -3.55 -3.36 -0.84 -1.67 -1.04
2 -0.11 -1.2 0.87 -0.8 -0.39 2 -3.82 -2.74 -0.52 -1.65 -1.96 2 -2.11 -1.82 0.13 -1.41 -1.29
3 -0.56 -0.81 0.99 -0.97 -1.16 3 -2.4 -1.13 -0.81 -1.45 -1.47 3 -1.28 -1.06 -0.01 -1.49 -1.7
4 -0.65 -0.18 0.67 -1.07 -1.35 4 -1.68 -1.72 -1.48 -1.99 -0.74 4 -1.26 -1.31 -0.82 -2.12 -1.57
5 -0.83 -0.65 -0.22 -1.05 -1.29 5 -2.43 -1.76 -1.27 -1.63 -0.86 5 -1.62 -1.38 -1.19 -1.74 -1.45
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.42 -0.9 -0.92 -0.06 -1.1 1 -4.52 -4.98 0.24 0.02 -0.39 1 -2.59 -3.21 -0.29 -0.37 -0.91
2 0.56 -0.5 -0.26 -0.45 -1.1 2 -3.32 -1.78 -0.28 -0.12 -0.77 2 -1.62 -0.89 -0.14 -0.39 -1.05
3 0.13 -0.53 -0.39 -0.96 -1.57 3 -1.75 -0.65 -0.25 -0.6 -0.55 3 -0.73 -0.54 -0.25 -0.99 -1.38
4 -0.03 -0.31 -0.73 -1.04 -1.4 4 -1.2 -0.94 -0.68 -0.86 -0.16 4 -0.8 -0.82 -0.88 -1.45 -1.16
5 -0.33 -0.49 -1.1 -0.9 -1.23 5 -1.66 -1.05 -0.75 -0.65 -0.14 5 -1.08 -0.89 -1.14 -1.18 -0.98
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 3.5: Monthly Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Excess Return 
 
 
Monthly Portfolio - Annualized Percentage Excess Return
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 1.61 3.78 0.01 4.6 -0.78 1 0.01 -0.96 -3.58 -4.06 -3.37 1 0.3 2.26 -1.02 0.02 -2.42
3 2.01 2.6 1.69 3.63 0.27 3 0.26 -1.72 -4.02 -3.2 -3.47 3 1.23 1.16 -0.94 0.17 -1.5
6 2.49 3.34 2.82 2.1 1.93 6 -2.43 -3.45 -4.05 -3.6 -3.3 6 0.3 0.29 -0.33 -0.5 -1.62
9 2.77 3.58 2.25 2.06 2.27 9 -1.06 -3.8 -2.97 -2.53 -2.51 9 0.95 0.35 -0.1 -0.41 -1.38
12 1.99 2.69 2.87 2.31 2.92 12 -1.16 -3 -2.56 -1.78 -1.6 12 0.59 0.28 0.08 -0.59 -0.78
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 2.68 3.48 4.71 4.78 3.08 1 1.72 0.71 -4.22 -0.66 -4.36 1 1.86 2.42 0.56 1.73 -0.63
3 2.35 3.66 3.88 4.03 3.3 3 1.92 -1.01 -2.82 -1.31 -3.62 3 1.94 1.44 0.75 1.21 -0.37
6 2.12 3.05 3.86 3.25 3.13 6 -1.27 -2.88 -3.38 -2.48 -2.57 6 0.48 0.27 0.4 0.29 -0.81
9 2.4 2.85 3.12 3.08 3.37 9 -1.21 -2.8 -2.95 -2.39 -1.87 9 0.68 0.34 0.06 0.04 -0.62
12 1.85 2.6 3.55 3.53 3.8 12 -0.86 -2.16 -2.28 -1.6 -0.64 12 0.76 0.38 0.1 -0.01 0.01
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 2.06 3.54 4.4 4.67 2.53 1 1.13 2.11 -2.72 -0.63 -3.86 1 1.22 2.92 0.91 1.58 -0.48
3 1.57 3.64 3.6 4.05 2.27 3 1.66 -0.63 -2.24 -0.85 -2.96 3 1.53 1.43 0.89 1.35 -0.39
6 1.58 2.88 3.07 3.03 2.37 6 -1.18 -2.27 -3.01 -2.12 -2.1 6 0.22 0.46 0.18 0.22 -0.51
9 2.01 2.63 2.67 2.63 2.39 9 -1.51 -2.26 -2.75 -2.03 -1.55 9 0.23 0.55 -0.04 -0.19 -0.42
12 1.59 2.25 3 2.84 3.06 12 -1.25 -1.91 -2.11 -1.54 -0.46 12 0.25 0.38 -0.1 -0.26 0.08
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 3.6: Monthly Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Spot Return 
 
Monthly Portfolio - Annualized Percentage Spot Return
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 -1.88 -0.99 -3 -0.64 -1.16 1 0.14 -0.72 -1.79 0.73 -5.55 1 -1.05 -0.67 -1.85 -0.62 -2.5
3 -0.76 -0.19 -0.76 -0.21 -1.12 3 -0.37 -2.5 -2.46 -1.92 -2.86 3 -0.4 -1.04 -1.39 -1.51 -2.14
6 -0.27 -0.94 -0.25 -0.57 -2 6 -1.97 -3.31 -3.3 -2.97 -2.93 6 -0.95 -1.64 -1.54 -2.22 -3.14
9 0.05 -0.56 -1.09 -1.1 -1.81 9 -0.99 -3.36 -2.44 -1.97 -2.3 9 -0.29 -1.3 -1.73 -2.04 -2.28
12 -1.07 -1.34 -0.66 -1.34 -1.1 12 -1.15 -2.42 -1.98 -0.3 -0.4 12 -0.86 -1.17 -1.49 -1.48 -1.33
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 -1.09 -2.17 -2.34 -1.54 -2.2 1 1.72 1.32 -2.51 -0.73 -4.94 1 -0.03 -0.18 -1.59 -1.14 -1.75
3 -0.73 -0.89 -1.81 -0.94 -2.16 3 1.93 -0.81 -1.66 -1.51 -4.11 3 0.64 -0.45 -1.1 -1.26 -1.79
6 -0.39 -1.09 -1.38 -1.56 -2.35 6 -0.83 -2.33 -3.22 -2.53 -3.21 6 -0.37 -1.29 -1.88 -2.19 -2.61
9 0.3 -1.05 -1.21 -1.74 -2.56 9 -0.98 -2.7 -2.99 -2.38 -2.14 9 -0.09 -1.35 -2.03 -2.29 -2.46
12 -0.2 -1.13 -1.03 -1.55 -1.91 12 -0.68 -2.13 -2.08 -1.29 -0.95 12 -0.19 -1.21 -1.82 -1.76 -1.88
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 -1.1 -1.26 -1.82 -0.39 -2.9 1 0.94 1.3 -2.23 0.23 -2.88 1 -0.51 0.64 -1.54 -0.11 -1.76
3 -1.02 0.02 -1.52 -0.62 -1.6 3 1.56 -0.98 -1.76 -1.54 -3.21 3 0.21 -0.09 -1.27 -1.13 -1.62
6 -0.45 -0.48 -1.45 -1.13 -1.59 6 -0.92 -2.53 -2.78 -2.54 -2.3 6 -0.61 -1.11 -1.67 -1.83 -1.99
9 0.16 -0.43 -1.24 -1.31 -1.89 9 -1.34 -2.61 -2.66 -2.25 -1.64 9 -0.59 -1.02 -1.62 -1.89 -2.04
12 -0.15 -0.59 -1.09 -1.37 -1.3 12 -1.24 -2.2 -1.87 -1.36 -0.5 12 -0.69 -0.96 -1.35 -1.57 -1.42
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.1: Daily Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Excess Return (Majors) 
 
Daily Portfolio - Annualized Excess Percentage Return (Majors Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 5.73 1.98 -1.21 -0.4 -1 1 3.59 -0.88 0.57 -1.64 0.5 1 5.29 1.42 0.53 -0.34 0.09
2 0.64 -1.06 -2.56 -1.75 -1.59 2 1.21 -1.03 -0.86 -1.26 -2 2 1.41 -0.1 -1.21 -1.19 -1.4
3 -1.01 -1.44 -2.35 -1.4 -1.46 3 -0.83 -0.84 -1 -1.87 -2.16 3 -0.71 -0.52 -1.45 -1.44 -1.57
4 -1.07 -1.22 -1.78 -0.65 -1.23 4 -0.41 -1.16 -1.3 -1.79 -1.47 4 -0.54 -0.74 -1.28 -1.09 -1.05
5 -0.57 -0.77 -0.86 -0.39 -1.13 5 -0.56 -1.6 -1.16 -1.38 -1.01 5 -0.32 -0.79 -0.89 -0.67 -0.73
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 3.37 1.47 -0.4 0.25 -0.95 1 -0.59 0.28 0.77 0.21 -1.51 1 1.82 1.69 0.96 0.84 -0.6
2 0.19 -0.81 -1.27 -0.85 -0.74 2 -0.52 -0.13 -0.81 -1.85 -3.41 2 0.3 0.18 -0.53 -1.07 -1.69
3 -0.82 -1.09 -1.73 -1.11 -0.87 3 -0.9 -0.48 -1.96 -2.22 -3.61 3 -0.63 -0.33 -1.53 -1.47 -1.92
4 -1.07 -1.18 -1.33 -0.74 -0.64 4 -0.28 -0.61 -2.14 -2.36 -2.82 4 -0.49 -0.58 -1.54 -1.37 -1.41
5 -0.71 -0.64 -0.81 -0.55 -0.79 5 -0.89 -1.49 -1.82 -1.95 -2.4 5 -0.63 -0.75 -1.19 -1.01 -1.25
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 2.64 0.87 -0.08 -0.09 -0.19 1 0.59 -0.31 1.18 0.48 -1.13 1 1.95 0.98 1.12 0.74 -0.52
2 0.49 -0.88 -1.24 -0.94 -0.92 2 -0.56 -0.81 -0.43 -1.44 -1.9 2 0.3 -0.39 -0.4 -0.9 -1.26
3 -0.4 -1.33 -1.68 -1.03 -0.95 3 -0.8 -0.66 -1.55 -2.14 -2.72 3 -0.5 -0.68 -1.37 -1.39 -1.74
4 -0.78 -1.15 -1.39 -0.82 -0.69 4 -0.49 -1.03 -1.76 -2.38 -2.4 4 -0.53 -0.89 -1.38 -1.45 -1.46
5 -0.41 -0.68 -0.73 -0.51 -0.54 5 -1.02 -1.47 -1.64 -1.95 -2.09 5 -0.62 -0.92 -1.11 -1.13 -1.22
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.2: Daily Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Excess Return (Minors & Exotics) 
  
Daily Portfolio - Annualized Excess Percentage Return (Minors & Exotics Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 4.51 3.18 -0.59 -4.18 -1.78 1 4.74 5.72 3.96 -1.77 -2.3 1 4.24 4.49 1.7 -2.8 -1.57
2 1.93 0.49 -1.95 -2.97 -1.88 2 1.16 0.76 0.35 -2.99 -1.85 2 1.15 0.6 -0.88 -3.23 -1.8
3 -0.77 -0.33 -1.94 -2.2 -0.47 3 0.79 -0.55 -1.58 -2.97 -2.1 3 -0.25 -0.57 -2.1 -2.95 -1.7
4 -0.86 0.29 -1.67 -0.72 0.07 4 -0.65 -2.12 -2.76 -2.61 -1.49 4 -0.81 -1.29 -2.6 -2.16 -1.24
5 -0.23 0.81 -1.1 0.01 1.72 5 -1.77 -1.91 -2.54 -1.43 -1.12 5 -1.28 -1.02 -2.39 -1.3 -0.33
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 2.05 -0.52 -1.57 0 0.11 1 3.9 3.6 2.03 0.71 -2.48 1 2.72 1.76 0.48 0.56 -1.29
2 0.69 -2.1 -2.86 -1.3 -0.27 2 0.87 0.37 -0.49 -1.78 -2.69 2 0.71 -0.7 -1.28 -1.59 -1.67
3 -1.82 -2.29 -2.17 -0.91 0.15 3 0.17 -0.75 -2.73 -2.16 -1.94 3 -0.85 -1.38 -2.38 -1.81 -1.27
4 -1.15 -1.35 -1.07 0.35 1.3 4 -0.83 -2.39 -3.13 -2.36 -1.87 4 -0.96 -1.88 -2.16 -1.38 -0.76
5 -0.87 -0.76 -0.44 0.86 2.04 5 -1.82 -2.27 -2.53 -1.98 -1.5 5 -1.45 -1.62 -1.74 -1.05 -0.26
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 1.58 -0.57 -1.59 0.04 0.24 1 4.34 4.43 4.29 0.9 -1.26 1 2.98 2.18 1.61 0.63 -0.56
2 0.47 -2.35 -2.09 -0.77 0.15 2 1.77 1.37 0.45 -2.1 -2.08 2 1.17 -0.26 -0.49 -1.37 -1.02
3 -1.16 -2.45 -1.86 -0.59 0.14 3 0.46 0.14 -1.63 -2.94 -1.78 3 -0.33 -0.99 -1.6 -1.84 -1.04
4 -0.23 -1.29 -1.12 0.08 0.9 4 -0.43 -1.65 -2.21 -2.92 -1.69 4 -0.31 -1.44 -1.63 -1.57 -0.72
5 -0.03 -0.66 -0.62 0.41 1.24 5 -0.9 -2.17 -1.82 -2.35 -1.29 5 -0.53 -1.46 -1.3 -1.23 -0.39
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.3: Daily Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Spot Return (Majors) 
 
Daily Portfolio - Annualized Spot Percentage Return (Majors Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 6.45 2.3 -0.52 -0.5 -0.8 1 5.34 -0.93 -0.14 -1.53 -0.35 1 6.55 1.75 0.63 -0.2 -0.09
2 1.84 -0.74 -2.26 -1.56 -1.28 2 2.93 -1.37 -1.23 -0.81 -2.46 2 2.76 -0.09 -1.09 -0.86 -1.41
3 -0.19 -1.16 -2.08 -1 -1.17 3 0.43 -1.04 -1.24 -1.21 -2.57 3 0.34 -0.55 -1.33 -0.91 -1.61
4 -0.28 -0.96 -1.7 -0.41 -1 4 0.81 -1.32 -1.38 -1.45 -1.68 4 0.46 -0.74 -1.18 -0.77 -1.02
5 0.07 -0.58 -0.78 -0.3 -0.75 5 0.38 -1.77 -1.36 -1.05 -1.19 5 0.46 -0.82 -0.87 -0.46 -0.64
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 4.88 1.46 -0.43 0.64 -0.82 1 1.28 0.1 0.28 -0.44 -1.9 1 3.52 1.6 0.75 0.73 -0.87
2 1.54 -0.7 -1.11 -0.8 -0.79 2 1.15 -0.59 -1.07 -2 -3.72 2 1.77 -0.05 -0.54 -1.13 -1.9
3 0.25 -0.99 -1.82 -0.87 -0.88 3 0.44 -0.86 -2.01 -2.36 -3.92 3 0.56 -0.52 -1.54 -1.41 -2.13
4 -0.18 -1.14 -1.28 -0.53 -0.46 4 0.73 -0.97 -2.16 -2.5 -3.14 4 0.43 -0.74 -1.46 -1.32 -1.52
5 -0.03 -0.54 -0.6 -0.46 -0.53 5 -0.03 -1.8 -1.81 -2.03 -2.68 5 0.15 -0.86 -1.05 -0.98 -1.28
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 3.66 1.23 0.4 0.36 0.15 1 1.71 -0.61 0.7 0.23 -1.01 1 3.03 0.98 1.09 0.86 -0.3
2 1.22 -0.58 -0.93 -0.75 -0.58 2 0.39 -0.83 -0.7 -1.48 -1.79 2 1.15 -0.29 -0.36 -0.82 -1.02
3 0.28 -1.14 -1.46 -0.84 -0.52 3 -0.06 -0.78 -1.7 -2.28 -2.71 3 0.23 -0.68 -1.28 -1.36 -1.5
4 -0.12 -0.95 -1.2 -0.63 -0.41 4 0.16 -1.1 -1.77 -2.47 -2.44 4 0.13 -0.86 -1.24 -1.39 -1.34
5 0.11 -0.5 -0.64 -0.31 -0.28 5 -0.55 -1.5 -1.7 -2.12 -2.11 5 -0.1 -0.86 -1.04 -1.12 -1.1
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.4: Daily Portfolio – Annualized Percentage Spot Return (Minors & Exotics) 
 
Daily Portfolio - Annualized Spot Percentage Return (Minors & Exotics Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 6.39 1.93 -0.61 -4.7 -1.34 1 6.21 5.96 3.23 -1.4 -3.93 1 5.94 4.05 1.37 -2.92 -2.35
2 3.64 -1.06 -1.99 -4.37 -0.74 2 1.93 0.91 -0.12 -3.11 -3.19 2 2.4 -0.03 -1.05 -4 -2.13
3 0.5 -1.4 -1.9 -3.13 0.86 3 1.7 -0.79 -2.32 -3.26 -3.29 3 0.88 -1.13 -2.42 -3.59 -1.76
4 0.04 -1.16 -1.07 -1.58 1.48 4 0.32 -2.16 -3.52 -2.82 -3.01 4 0.16 -1.9 -2.69 -2.71 -1.4
5 0.34 -0.36 -0.57 -0.65 2.85 5 -0.92 -2.18 -3.42 -1.76 -2.37 5 -0.48 -1.61 -2.56 -1.84 -0.49
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 3.42 -1.09 -2.07 -1.27 0.75 1 4.49 4.63 1.76 0.19 -2.18 1 3.67 2.12 0.15 -0.17 -0.88
2 1.32 -2.63 -3.16 -2.15 0.78 2 1.63 0.83 -0.53 -2.1 -2.91 2 1.42 -0.59 -1.44 -1.97 -1.34
3 -0.98 -2.84 -2.47 -1.38 0.66 3 0.79 -0.31 -2.7 -2.46 -2.55 3 -0.11 -1.31 -2.54 -2.04 -1.36
4 -0.35 -1.84 -1.25 -0.23 1.69 4 -0.17 -1.85 -3.33 -2.91 -2.38 4 -0.27 -1.78 -2.35 -1.83 -0.88
5 -0.22 -0.96 -0.6 0.29 2.08 5 -1.32 -2.06 -2.89 -2.6 -1.92 5 -0.88 -1.56 -2 -1.54 -0.5
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 3.33 -0.46 -2.3 0.02 -0.3 1 4.72 4.31 3.68 0.86 -1.4 1 4.06 2.21 1.03 0.65 -0.8
2 1.42 -1.95 -2.15 -0.56 -0.15 2 2.09 1.04 0.36 -2.27 -2.69 2 1.87 -0.21 -0.51 -1.29 -1.41
3 -0.5 -2.07 -1.9 -0.39 0.01 3 0.67 0.03 -1.53 -3.1 -2.34 3 0.15 -0.87 -1.52 -1.77 -1.37
4 0.29 -0.91 -1.12 0.36 0.74 4 -0.23 -1.64 -2.3 -3.11 -2.32 4 0.07 -1.26 -1.63 -1.51 -1.1
5 0.42 -0.38 -0.53 0.69 1.05 5 -0.87 -2.23 -1.89 -2.68 -1.96 5 -0.27 -1.36 -1.27 -1.25 -0.83
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.5: Weekly Portfolio Annualized Percentage Excess Return (Majors) 
–  
Weekly Portfolio - Annualized Excess Percentage Return (Majors Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -1.33 -2.36 -1.78 -0.96 -3.16 1 -4.91 -0.42 2.14 1.86 1.14 1 -2.77 -1.58 0.72 0.28 -1.16
2 -1.73 -1.99 -2.16 -2.71 -3.6 2 -1.75 -1.04 1.97 1.16 -0.32 2 -1.59 -1.07 0.1 -0.94 -2.28
3 -2.13 -2.26 -2.85 -2.56 -3.02 3 -1.84 -0.47 1.12 -0.36 -0.3 3 -1.62 -1.13 -0.92 -1.84 -2.27
4 -2.08 -2.32 -2.7 -1.71 -2.3 4 -1.48 -0.65 -0.06 -1.93 0.28 4 -2 -1.7 -1.72 -2.56 -1.78
5 -1.78 -1.71 -1.88 -0.88 -1.43 5 -3.29 -1.48 -0.16 -1.05 1.02 5 -2.73 -1.76 -1.52 -1.7 -0.8
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.86 -0.89 -0.72 -1.82 -3.79 1 -4.94 0.92 -0.75 0.92 0.62 1 -2.65 -0.13 -0.53 -0.74 -1.73
2 -0.56 -0.98 -1.28 -2.1 -3.53 2 -2.37 -0.34 0.45 0.47 -1.2 2 -1.56 -0.54 -0.56 -1.11 -2.58
3 -0.62 -1.47 -2.15 -2.06 -2.86 3 -1.69 -0.53 -0.26 -0.58 -1 3 -0.96 -1.11 -1.26 -1.8 -2.53
4 -0.74 -1.88 -1.94 -1.49 -1.85 4 -1.22 -0.95 -0.11 -0.64 -0.69 4 -1.29 -1.73 -1.46 -1.8 -2.02
5 -0.84 -1.47 -1.36 -0.86 -1.51 5 -2.16 -1.2 -0.27 -0.21 -0.24 5 -1.75 -1.7 -1.3 -1.19 -1.48
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.77 -1.83 -0.72 -1.59 -1.61 1 -2.63 0.33 0 0.3 -1.77 1 -1.76 -0.99 -0.12 -1 -1.87
2 -0.39 -1.15 -0.9 -1.52 -1.86 2 -1.3 -0.41 0.44 0.55 -1.48 2 -1.15 -0.83 -0.3 -0.62 -1.92
3 -0.14 -1.14 -1.17 -1.4 -1.54 3 -1.08 -0.62 -0.16 -0.17 -1.11 3 -0.67 -1.01 -0.7 -0.96 -1.75
4 -0.58 -1.35 -1.43 -1.26 -1.02 4 -0.65 -1.09 -0.26 -0.11 -0.81 4 -0.94 -1.47 -1.13 -1.1 -1.4
5 -0.89 -1.07 -0.89 -0.85 -0.81 5 -1.18 -1.02 -0.25 -0.22 -0.37 5 -1.26 -1.32 -0.92 -0.88 -0.98
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.6: Weekly Portfolio Annualized Percentage Excess Return (Minors & Exotics) 
 
Weekly Portfolio - Annualized Excess Percentage Return  (Minors & Exotics Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.71 7.15 5.37 3.72 3.64 1 -5.31 -1.96 0.09 -0.56 -2.74 1 -2.88 1 2.37 1.3 0.04
2 2.9 4.79 6.12 4.66 4.41 2 -4.23 0.33 0.09 -2.16 -2.02 2 -0.68 2.2 3.08 1.11 1.15
3 2.18 5.37 6.55 3.98 3.73 3 -1.98 0.8 0.35 -1.57 -2.23 3 0.24 2.63 3.32 1.27 0.56
4 3.38 5.76 4.87 3.19 2.62 4 -1.8 -0.76 -1.15 -2.83 -2.25 4 0.8 1.89 1.62 -0.1 0.11
5 2.88 4.39 3.69 2.19 2.79 5 -2.39 -0.63 -1.47 -2.53 -2.07 5 0.45 1.48 0.78 -0.15 0.4
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 2.19 4.14 5.27 5.85 5.83 1 -3.15 -3.83 0.17 0.39 -0.54 1 -1.39 -0.49 2.29 2.28 2.06
2 2.64 4.01 6.03 5.93 4.68 2 -3.02 -1.17 -0.32 -0.47 -0.56 2 -0.51 1.3 2.45 2.37 1.82
3 2.77 4.38 5.35 5.07 3.68 3 -1.12 -0.62 -0.54 -1.02 -0.8 3 0.61 1.64 2.12 1.77 1.18
4 2.6 4.38 4.78 4.54 3.27 4 -0.77 -0.81 -1.56 -1.68 -0.6 4 0.66 1.45 1.24 0.95 1.11
5 2.09 3.76 3.73 3.69 2.56 5 -0.65 -1.02 -1.88 -1.43 -0.81 5 0.62 1.12 0.55 0.83 0.8
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 1.94 3.56 4.1 3.99 5.47 1 -3.19 -4.52 0.36 1.24 -0.32 1 -1.28 -1.08 1.8 2.06 1.99
2 2.67 3.49 4 4.6 4.18 2 -3.39 -0.65 0.11 0.77 -0.24 2 -0.6 1.27 1.72 2.33 1.6
3 2.25 3.59 3.63 3.6 2.98 3 -1.46 -0.06 0.13 0.74 -0.45 3 0.3 1.49 1.59 1.82 0.95
4 2.42 3.32 3.28 2.99 2.7 4 -1.21 -0.24 -0.26 0.03 -0.48 4 0.43 1.15 1.15 1.06 0.76
5 2.05 2.91 2.49 2.33 1.73 5 -1.15 -0.67 -0.92 -0.39 -0.8 5 0.36 0.8 0.45 0.65 0.31
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.7: Weekly Portfolio Annualized Percentage Spot Return (Majors) 
 
Weekly Portfolio - Annualized Spot Percentage Return (Majors Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -1.47 -3.68 -4.67 -2.39 -4.81 1 -4.52 0.39 3.86 2.67 1.19 1 -2.68 -1.74 0.07 -0.19 -1.57
2 -1.93 -2.56 -3.9 -3.04 -5.14 2 -2.08 -0.67 2.5 1.86 -0.35 2 -1.87 -1.2 -0.63 -0.89 -2.8
3 -2.23 -2.77 -4.06 -3.14 -4.71 3 -1.8 -0.15 1.68 0.18 -0.61 3 -1.67 -1.27 -1.26 -1.88 -3.07
4 -2.23 -3.12 -3.68 -2.22 -3.77 4 -1.36 -0.47 0.26 -1.3 -0.15 4 -2.04 -2.06 -2.08 -2.57 -2.64
5 -2.08 -2.27 -2.63 -1.46 -2.6 5 -3.04 -1.39 0.12 -0.57 0.59 5 -2.78 -2.05 -1.77 -1.78 -1.6
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -1.19 -1.93 -2 -3.37 -3.99 1 -5.08 1.22 0.49 1.37 0.38 1 -2.93 -0.51 -0.38 -1.24 -1.79
2 -0.9 -2.05 -2.15 -3.39 -4.11 2 -2.53 0.02 0.9 0.5 -1.12 2 -1.84 -0.86 -0.73 -1.6 -2.73
3 -0.89 -2.23 -2.92 -3.27 -4 3 -2.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.53 -1.07 3 -1.29 -1.16 -1.5 -2.24 -3.04
4 -1.15 -2.78 -2.79 -2.96 -2.97 4 -1.53 -0.61 0.19 -0.59 -0.74 4 -1.63 -1.9 -1.75 -2.4 -2.49
5 -1.29 -2.32 -2.21 -2.18 -2.51 5 -2.39 -1.03 -0.1 -0.21 -0.31 5 -2.06 -1.93 -1.67 -1.78 -1.9
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.83 -2.17 -1.91 -2.17 -3.07 1 -2.89 0.63 0.24 0.35 -1.95 1 -1.98 -1 -0.45 -0.9 -2.76
2 -0.74 -1.89 -1.94 -2.55 -2.81 2 -1.41 -0.32 0.44 0.08 -1.39 2 -1.37 -1.13 -0.71 -1.23 -2.42
3 -0.78 -1.67 -2.15 -2.45 -2.38 3 -1.09 -0.42 -0.29 -0.75 -1.34 3 -0.96 -1.2 -1.19 -1.67 -2.32
4 -1.11 -1.83 -2.19 -2.26 -1.65 4 -0.7 -1.09 -0.45 -0.53 -0.78 4 -1.23 -1.73 -1.57 -1.73 -1.75
5 -1.4 -1.68 -1.61 -1.77 -1.41 5 -1.32 -0.98 -0.56 -0.54 -0.51 5 -1.58 -1.62 -1.43 -1.44 -1.37
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.8: Weekly Portfolio Annualized Percentage Spot Return (Minors & Exotics) 
 
Weekly Portfolio - Annualized Spot Percentage Return  (Minors & Exotics Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -1.27 0.3 2.32 0.34 -1.47 1 -5.25 -2.26 0.74 -2.79 -3.36 1 -3.99 -2.2 0.97 -1.62 -2.2
2 0.77 -0.19 3.38 1.82 0.28 2 -4.64 0.06 -0.17 -1.72 -2.28 2 -2.13 -0.27 1.56 -0.05 -0.57
3 -0.42 0.36 2.72 0.93 -0.98 3 -2.2 0.63 -0.02 -1.61 -1.83 3 -1.19 0.32 1.25 -0.29 -1.19
4 0.51 1.27 1.61 0.24 -1.17 4 -2.01 -0.79 -0.93 -2.94 -2.35 4 -0.7 -0.09 0.02 -1.69 -1.46
5 -0.12 0.44 0.61 -0.47 -1.01 5 -2.76 -0.23 -1.02 -2.81 -2.04 5 -1.23 -0.04 -0.51 -1.69 -1.27
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.38 1.59 2.15 2.08 2.93 1 -3.5 -2.88 0.54 1.26 -0.23 1 -2.44 -1.23 0.89 1.15 0.96
2 0.67 1.31 2.83 2.3 2.1 2 -3.49 -0.93 -0.34 -0.19 -0.85 2 -1.66 0.17 1.04 0.9 0.57
3 0.65 1.25 1.94 1.74 1.08 3 -1.38 -0.49 -0.5 -0.43 -0.84 3 -0.45 0.19 0.66 0.56 -0.03
4 0.72 1.68 1.27 1.2 0.38 4 -0.98 -0.86 -1.21 -0.97 -0.72 4 -0.29 0.12 -0.15 -0.23 -0.31
5 0.09 0.95 0.3 0.48 -0.16 5 -0.61 -0.99 -1.63 -0.8 -1.02 5 -0.28 -0.17 -0.81 -0.34 -0.59
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.69 1.32 1.78 1.69 1.83 1 -3.49 -4.85 0.82 1.21 -0.01 1 -1.96 -2.39 0.87 0.78 0.51
2 1.13 1.14 2.32 2.04 1.37 2 -3.35 -0.88 0.29 0.45 -0.2 2 -1.31 0.02 1.04 0.94 0.44
3 0.92 1.22 1.73 1.33 0.29 3 -1.01 -0.15 0.28 0.51 -0.39 3 -0.08 0.34 0.8 0.64 -0.23
4 1.04 1.36 0.93 0.69 -0.11 4 -1 -0.33 -0.1 -0.08 -0.38 4 -0.12 0.23 0.15 -0.1 -0.43
5 0.9 0.98 0.27 0.2 -0.81 5 -0.98 -0.74 -0.89 -0.26 -0.7 5 -0.1 -0.06 -0.54 -0.23 -0.77
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.9: Monthly Portfolio Annualized Percentage Excess Return (Majors) 
 
Monthly Portfolio - Annualized Excess Percentage Return (Majors Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 0 0.53 0.44 1.02 1.64 1 0 -0.99 -0.92 -1.53 -1.07 1 0 -0.19 0.22 0 0.18
3 -0.72 4.69 2.55 3.18 0.92 3 2.35 1.83 -3.88 -1.96 -2.26 3 0.26 2.81 -1.01 -0.08 0.48
6 1.63 3.09 1.6 2.11 1.24 6 2.24 1.97 -3.71 -0.94 -0.67 6 1.7 2.52 -1.23 0.09 0.98
9 0.78 1.42 1 1.46 1.43 9 -0.88 -1.57 -3.02 -1.97 -0.72 9 -0.13 -0.21 -1.22 -0.08 0.55
12 1.07 0.91 0.64 1.16 1.24 12 -1.38 -1.68 -1.87 -1.74 -0.42 12 -0.25 -0.18 -0.25 0.3 0.61
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 2.5 0.33 0.86 1.5 1.56 1 0.76 -0.16 0.12 -0.42 -0.69 1 0.54 0.09 0.59 0.8 0.08
3 -0.83 4.03 3.04 2.6 2.01 3 2.83 2.19 -1.29 0.16 -2.3 3 0.67 2.38 0.57 0.72 0.65
6 1.47 3.46 2.42 1.7 1.78 6 1.54 0.42 -0.49 0.32 -1.13 6 1.2 1.86 0.82 0.53 0.82
9 1.21 1.77 1.52 1.13 2 9 -0.59 -0.83 -0.42 -0.56 -0.88 9 0.17 0.46 0.45 0.22 0.45
12 0.89 0.94 1.24 1.34 2.12 12 -0.43 -0.27 -0.5 -0.9 -0.75 12 0.19 0.48 0.72 0.18 0.09
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 2.53 0.36 0.73 1 1.78 1 0.41 0.02 0.32 -0.26 -0.72 1 0.39 0.1 0.67 0.54 0.18
3 -0.54 3.46 2.65 2.17 0.93 3 1.6 1.93 -1.85 0.81 -2.16 3 0.31 2.14 -0.08 1.43 -0.06
6 1.21 2.76 1.97 1.58 1.28 6 0.99 0.63 -0.95 0.85 -1.01 6 0.74 1.69 0.42 1.26 0.38
9 0.92 1.34 0.93 1.03 1.04 9 -0.65 -0.38 -0.21 -0.06 -0.95 9 -0.09 0.48 0.3 0.65 -0.07
12 0.74 0.68 0.47 1.37 1.4 12 -0.13 0.08 -0.13 -0.52 -0.96 12 0.15 0.58 0.48 0.45 -0.18
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.10: Monthly Portfolio Annualized Percentage Excess Return (Minors & Exotics) 
 
Monthly Portfolio - Annualized Excess Percentage Return (Minors & Exotics Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period 
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 2.94 2.36 2.04 3.68 -0.4 1 -2.11 -0.8 -2.7 -0.17 -2.7 1 0.07 2.04 0.29 1.59 -2.4
3 1.86 3.3 2.39 3.31 -0.3 3 0.85 -1.59 -2.22 -2.7 -4.98 3 1.53 1.6 0.34 0.64 -3.15
6 2.39 4.73 3.14 1.76 1.35 6 -0.11 -2.56 -3.26 -4.29 -3.55 6 1.26 1.59 0.18 -0.77 -2.09
9 2.86 4.8 2.42 1.11 0.9 9 -0.12 -3.16 -3.53 -3.54 -2.21 9 1.45 1.33 -0.3 -1.12 -1.69
12 2.32 3.62 2.49 1.18 1.3 12 -0.86 -2.77 -2.9 -2.3 -1.14 12 1.01 0.77 -0.18 -1.07 -1.15
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 2.85 2.61 6.45 5.16 2.56 1 0.64 0.92 -2.53 -2.25 -3.53 1 1.48 2.72 2.32 1.46 -0.31
3 1.95 3.44 5.17 4.25 2.2 3 0.81 -1.66 -2.18 -2.77 -5.02 3 1.48 1.1 1.7 0.59 -1.34
6 2.22 3.11 4.47 3.41 1.74 6 -1.09 -2.87 -3.56 -3.77 -3.8 6 0.76 0.45 0.69 -0.54 -1.65
9 2.53 2.82 3.85 2.95 1.41 9 -1.02 -3.17 -3.62 -3.27 -2.8 9 0.81 0.15 0.02 -0.74 -1.46
12 1.95 2.59 4.26 2.66 2.21 12 -1.07 -2.87 -2.88 -2.53 -1.66 12 0.58 -0.12 0.13 -0.68 -0.69
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 2.14 2.14 4.62 3.23 2.34 1 -0.08 -0.42 -3.45 -1.31 -4.03 1 0.51 1.55 1.1 0.95 -0.78
3 1.51 2.46 3.75 2.94 2.44 3 -0.15 -1.31 -2.56 -3.16 -4.42 3 0.57 0.85 0.91 -0.31 -1.12
6 1.38 2.16 2.68 2.16 1.95 6 -1.22 -2.29 -2.7 -3.69 -3.52 6 0.09 0.46 0.28 -0.95 -1.16
9 1.62 2.46 2.52 2.21 1.63 9 -1.57 -2.72 -2.93 -3.08 -2.76 9 0.02 0.22 -0.23 -0.85 -0.95
12 1.47 2.41 2.8 2.21 2.01 12 -1.68 -2.48 -2.37 -2.29 -1.79 12 -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 -0.57 -0.49
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.11: Monthly Portfolio Annualized Percentage Spot Return (Majors) 
 
Monthly Portfolio - Annualized Spot Percentage Return (Majors Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 0 -0.65 -0.79 -0.81 -1.72 1 0 -0.88 -1.25 -1.95 -2.07 1 0 -0.65 -0.61 -0.65 -1.5
3 -1.5 2.78 0.56 -1.8 -4.24 3 2.31 2.77 -2.85 -3.12 -2.18 3 -0.08 2.77 -1.83 -2.63 -2.05
6 1.03 2.67 -0.04 -1.62 -3.77 6 1.98 1.84 -3.17 -2.38 -2.11 6 1.25 2.29 -1.84 -2.27 -1.51
9 0.01 0.59 -0.99 -2.56 -2.4 9 -0.42 -1.5 -2.82 -2.4 -2.86 9 -0.24 -0.57 -2.03 -2.19 -1.91
12 -0.04 -0.49 -1.24 -1.9 -2.07 12 -1.09 -1.51 -2.13 -2.51 -2.65 12 -0.6 -0.73 -1.1 -1.58 -1.9
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 -1.13 -0.48 -0.5 -0.98 -0.85 1 -1.25 -0.35 -0.41 -1.18 -1.44 1 -1.63 -0.42 -0.15 -0.53 -0.73
3 -2.01 0.39 0.54 0.3 -1.3 3 1.91 2.26 -1.86 0.29 -1.99 3 -0.35 1.22 -0.73 0.41 -0.67
6 0.32 1.54 -0.15 -0.41 -0.96 6 1.49 -0.06 -1.25 -0.45 -2.71 6 0.66 0.83 -0.59 -0.06 -0.76
9 0.15 0.22 -1.4 -1.11 -0.87 9 -0.57 -1.11 -1.16 -1.21 -2.01 9 -0.28 -0.45 -1.03 -0.39 -0.63
12 0.05 -0.4 -1.5 -0.96 -0.46 12 -0.67 -0.68 -1.21 -1.6 -2.12 12 -0.37 -0.28 -0.7 -0.41 -0.97
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 -0.08 -0.08 -0.4 -0.67 -0.65 1 -0.83 -0.18 0.01 -0.61 -1.31 1 -0.88 -0.21 0 -0.17 -0.64
3 -1.14 0.63 1.2 0.07 -1.63 3 1.24 1.62 -1.62 0.15 -3.07 3 -0.08 0.68 -0.46 0.35 -1.18
6 0.33 1.05 0.48 -0.41 -1.34 6 0.55 0.9 -0.86 -0.11 -2.45 6 0.16 1.05 -0.06 0.19 -0.57
9 0.21 0.13 -0.5 -0.98 -1.23 9 -1.07 -0.27 -0.46 -0.83 -1.85 9 -0.63 -0.01 -0.24 -0.15 -0.59
12 0.13 -0.23 -1.02 -0.78 -0.97 12 -0.36 -0.21 -0.57 -1.14 -1.82 12 -0.23 -0.02 -0.15 -0.22 -0.96
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 4.12: Monthly Portfolio Annualized Percentage Spot Return (Minors & Exotics) 
 
Monthly Portfolio - Annualized Spot Percentage Return (Minors & Exotics Only)
Pairs =1
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 -0.97 -0.09 -0.92 -0.43 -2.3 1 -2.49 -0.48 -2.8 0.92 -3.37 1 -2.03 0.72 -0.73 0.59 -1.65
3 -2.42 0.6 0.18 -0.18 -1.52 3 0.71 -2.8 -1.57 -3.55 -3.12 3 -0.41 -0.48 0.04 -1.67 -1.86
6 -1.66 0.18 -0.25 -0.88 -1.51 6 0.01 -3.11 -3.1 -4.74 -2.41 6 -0.28 -0.6 -1.22 -2.75 -2.27
9 -0.38 0.27 -1.08 -1.49 -1.94 9 -0.17 -3.5 -3.42 -3.87 -1.61 9 0.23 -0.83 -1.93 -2.53 -1.73
12 -0.95 -0.59 -0.69 -1.58 -1.13 12 -0.77 -2.99 -2.28 -1.81 -0.83 12 -0.35 -1.25 -1.28 -1.68 -1.16
Pairs =2
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 -0.5 -3.85 -2.31 -0.79 -4.18 1 0.3 0.26 -2.98 -1.54 -4.13 1 -0.54 -0.49 -1.31 -0.69 -2.72
3 -1.24 -1.03 -0.95 -1.08 -2.53 3 0.48 -1.89 -1.38 -2.82 -4.51 3 -0.33 -0.72 -0.24 -1.61 -2.9
6 -0.74 -0.93 -0.8 -1.41 -2.05 6 -0.83 -2.61 -2.86 -3.77 -2.79 6 -0.64 -0.88 -1.03 -2.49 -2.87
9 0.21 -0.94 -0.6 -1.61 -2.29 9 -0.95 -3.34 -3.1 -2.98 -1.61 9 -0.37 -1.33 -1.56 -2.41 -2.41
12 -0.23 -1.1 -0.8 -1.74 -1.76 12 -1.17 -3.04 -2.36 -1.72 -0.84 12 -0.65 -1.55 -1.46 -1.85 -1.67
Pairs =3
Before GFC After GFC Whole
1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12 1 3 6 9 12
1 -0.2 -2.38 -1.18 0.59 -2.73 1 -0.05 0.22 -3.18 -0.56 -2.56 1 -0.43 -0.18 -1.07 0.19 -1.6
3 -0.96 -1.2 -0.64 -0.39 -1.71 3 0 -1.26 -2.15 -2.24 -3.17 3 -0.42 -0.7 -0.66 -1.09 -1.83
6 -0.88 -0.88 -0.99 -0.73 -1.54 6 -0.89 -2.31 -2.74 -2.97 -2.03 6 -0.74 -0.9 -1.2 -1.65 -1.76
9 -0.29 -0.51 -0.8 -1.16 -1.84 9 -1.24 -2.71 -2.76 -2.43 -1.04 9 -0.68 -1.09 -1.43 -1.71 -1.5
12 -0.43 -0.8 -0.96 -1.02 -1.78 12 -1.42 -2.52 -2.35 -1.62 -0.41 12 -0.83 -1.36 -1.31 -1.28 -0.96
GFC = Global Financial Crisis, holdout period of 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2007
Before GFC = 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2007, After GFC = 1 January 2008 to 28 June 2013
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Table 5.1: Excess Returns vs. Changes in Speculative Open Interest Positions 
 
Formation Lag Open Long t Open Short t Open Long t Open Short t Open Long t Open Short t
1 1 0.001893 0.81 -0.002019 -1.31 0.003964 2.22 * -0.004281 -3.33 ** 0.003359 2.32 * -0.003554 -3.47 **
1 2 -0.002608 -1.02 0.000794 0.48 0.003332 1.56 0.002124 1.48 0.0026 1.49 0.00118 1.06
1 3 0.001622 0.65 -0.00084 -0.39 0.00243 0.95 0.002556 1.95 0.00278 1.35 0.001703 1.55
1 4 0.000655 0.25 0.000601 0.27 -0.002558 -1.43 0.002124 1.6 -0.00238 -1.58 0.001819 1.72
1 5 0.003723 1.29 -0.000348 -0.13 0.00306 1.36 -0.001376 -1 0.002949 1.61 -0.000762 -0.64
2 1 0.011315 4.97 ** -0.002728 -1.22 0.016971 8.33 ** -0.006583 -4.14 ** 0.016183 9.73 ** -0.005915 -4.62 **
2 2 -0.000857 -0.33 -0.000962 -0.67 0.006783 2.55 * 0.001538 0.87 0.005701 2.61 ** 0.00058 0.42
2 3 0.000766 0.29 -0.000403 -0.23 0.003081 0.94 0.005299 3.28 ** 0.003073 1.16 0.003855 2.94 **
2 4 0.003209 1.06 0.000166 0.09 0.000182 0.07 0.003178 1.89 0.000474 0.22 0.002825 2.13 *
2 5 0.000263 0.09 -0.000839 -0.4 0.001642 0.64 -0.000659 -0.38 0.000767 0.37 0.000299 0.21
3 1 0.017135 7.64 ** -0.003444 -1.57 0.027239 11.86 ** -0.006811 -3.34 ** 0.025908 13.48 ** -0.00603 -3.81 **
3 2 0.007895 3.12 ** -0.001803 -1.07 0.01501 4.84 ** 0.000539 0.24 0.014005 5.53 ** -0.000416 -0.24
3 3 0.00212 0.72 -0.000987 -0.55 0.005948 1.59 0.004944 2.31 * 0.005384 1.78 0.003515 2.03 *
3 4 0.000378 0.11 -0.000605 -0.29 0.00275 0.74 0.004586 2.13 * 0.002094 0.7 0.003992 2.32 *
3 5 -0.000991 -0.31 -0.000699 -0.33 0.002967 0.98 0.000762 0.35 0.001598 0.64 0.001325 0.76
4 1 0.01819 7.39 ** -0.004375 -2.06 * 0.033619 11.74 ** -0.00767 -3.13 ** 0.031511 13.15 ** -0.006853 -3.65 **
4 2 0.013367 4.83 ** -0.002559 -1.13 0.024027 6.48 ** -0.000422 -0.15 0.022555 7.43 ** -0.00112 -0.53
4 3 0.006483 1.99 * -0.001967 -0.86 0.013397 3.12 ** 0.003277 1.23 0.012255 3.52 ** 0.002204 1.03
4 4 -0.000754 -0.22 -0.00132 -0.65 0.005621 1.34 0.004325 1.6 0.003959 1.16 0.003518 1.67
4 5 -0.002671 -0.81 -0.000245 -0.11 0.005412 1.48 0.00225 0.83 0.003433 1.15 0.002448 1.17
5 1 0.019837 6.87 ** -0.005288 -2.13 * 0.038756 11.34 ** -0.008409 -3.04 ** 0.036119 12.56 ** -0.0076 -3.59 **
5 2 0.014037 4.33 ** -0.003747 -1.62 0.031366 7.22 ** -0.002717 -0.89 0.02885 8.07 ** -0.002762 -1.18
5 3 0.009816 2.7 ** -0.002411 -1.02 0.022123 4.75 ** 0.001697 0.56 0.020005 5.26 ** 0.000957 0.4
5 4 0.003468 0.88 -0.001174 -0.53 0.013002 2.9 ** 0.002732 0.9 0.010767 2.95 ** 0.002233 0.97
5 5 -0.002914 -0.8 -0.001331 -0.61 0.007803 1.83 0.002601 0.86 0.005263 1.51 0.002409 1.07
Regression results comparing excess returns from exchange rate movements with lagged changes in the quantities of open interest contracts either long or short a currency pair.
** Denotes significance at the 1% level, while * denotes significance at the 5% level.
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period
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Table 5.2: Spot Returns vs. Changes in Speculative Open Interest Positions 
 
Formation Lag Open Long t Open Short t Open Long t Open Short t Open Long t Open Short t
1 1 0.001902 0.82 -0.002023 -1.32 0.004004 2.24 * -0.004296 -3.34 ** 0.00341 2.35 * -0.003564 -3.47 **
1 2 -0.002597 -1.02 0.000789 0.48 0.003371 1.58 0.002107 1.47 0.002645 1.52 0.001169 1.05
1 3 0.001624 0.66 -0.000847 -0.39 0.002453 0.96 0.00255 1.94 0.002809 1.36 0.001696 1.54
1 4 0.000659 0.25 0.000596 0.27 -0.002541 -1.41 0.002118 1.6 -0.002352 -1.56 0.001813 1.71
1 5 0.00373 1.3 -0.000353 -0.14 0.003083 1.36 -0.00138 -1.01 0.002982 1.62 -0.000763 -0.64
2 1 0.011333 4.98 ** -0.002741 -1.23 0.017054 8.33 ** -0.006616 -4.15 ** 0.016282 9.74 ** -0.005938 -4.63 **
2 2 -0.000843 -0.33 -0.000973 -0.67 0.006851 2.57 * 0.001514 0.85 0.005785 2.65 ** 0.000562 0.4
2 3 0.000776 0.29 -0.000415 -0.24 0.003131 0.95 0.005285 3.26 ** 0.003137 1.18 0.00384 2.92 **
2 4 0.003217 1.06 0.000154 0.08 0.000222 0.08 0.00317 1.88 0.000532 0.25 0.002817 2.12 *
2 5 0.000272 0.09 -0.000845 -0.41 0.001703 0.66 -0.000666 -0.39 0.000841 0.4 0.000295 0.21
3 1 0.017158 7.64 ** -0.003463 -1.58 0.027345 11.82 ** -0.006859 -3.35 ** 0.02604 13.45 ** -0.006064 -3.82 **
3 2 0.007913 3.13 ** -0.001824 -1.09 0.01511 4.85 ** 0.000504 0.23 0.014127 5.55 ** -0.000444 -0.26
3 3 0.002135 0.72 -0.001006 -0.56 0.006028 1.6 0.004924 2.29 * 0.005486 1.8 0.003495 2.01 *
3 4 0.000392 0.12 -0.000619 -0.3 0.002831 0.76 0.004574 2.11 * 0.002194 0.73 0.003979 2.3 *
3 5 -0.000978 -0.3 -0.000708 -0.33 0.003069 1 0.000756 0.34 0.001715 0.68 0.001319 0.75
4 1 0.018212 7.4 ** -0.004398 -2.08 * 0.033748 11.69 ** -0.007738 -3.14 ** 0.031677 13.09 ** -0.006896 -3.65 **
4 2 0.013386 4.84 ** -0.002584 -1.15 0.024151 6.48 ** -0.000474 -0.17 0.022711 7.43 ** -0.001155 -0.54
4 3 0.006496 1.99 * -0.001991 -0.87 0.01352 3.13 ** 0.003245 1.21 0.012404 3.54 ** 0.00218 1.01
4 4 -0.000742 -0.21 -0.001335 -0.66 0.005748 1.36 0.004306 1.59 0.004108 1.2 0.003505 1.65
4 5 -0.002658 -0.81 -0.000252 -0.11 0.00556 1.5 0.002238 0.81 0.003599 1.19 0.002443 1.16
5 1 0.019854 6.88 ** -0.005312 -2.15 * 0.038913 11.27 ** -0.008495 -3.05 ** 0.036324 12.48 ** -0.00765 -3.58 **
5 2 0.014053 4.34 ** -0.003773 -1.64 0.031527 7.2 ** -0.002786 -0.9 0.029051 8.04 ** -0.002803 -1.19
5 3 0.00983 2.71 ** -0.002435 -1.03 0.022291 4.75 ** 0.00165 0.54 0.020204 5.26 ** 0.000928 0.38
5 4 0.003475 0.88 -0.001192 -0.53 0.013185 2.91 ** 0.002702 0.88 0.010975 2.97 ** 0.002217 0.95
5 5 -0.002909 -0.8 -0.001339 -0.61 0.008007 1.85 0.002583 0.85 0.005487 1.55 0.002405 1.06
Regression results comparing spot returns from exchange rate movements with lagged changes in the quantities of open interest contracts either long or short a currency pair.
** Denotes significance at the 1% level, while * denotes significance at the 5% level.
Before GFC After GFC Whole Period
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Chart 1.1: AUD/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013) 
 
Note: Blue shading denotes Global Financial Crisis period (1/6/2007 – 31/12/2007)  
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Chart 1.2: CAD/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.3: CZK/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
 
13.0000
15.0000
17.0000
19.0000
21.0000
23.0000
25.0000
27.0000
29.0000
31.0000
33.0000
1/07/2002 1/07/2003 1/07/2004 1/07/2005 1/07/2006 1/07/2007 1/07/2008 1/07/2009 1/07/2010 1/07/2011 1/07/2012
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
e
Date
CZECH KORUNA TO US $ - EXCHANGE RATE
 87 
 
 Chart 1.4: DKK/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.5: EUR/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.6: HKD/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.7: HUF/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.8: JPY/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.9: MXN/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.10: TRY/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.11: NZD/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.12: NOK/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.13: PLN/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.14: SGD/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.15: ZAR/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013)  
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Chart 1.16: SEK/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013) 
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Chart 1.17: CHF/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013) 
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Chart 1.18: GBP/USD Exchange Rate (June 2002 to July 2013) 
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Chart 2.1: AUD/USD - Exchange Rate, Open Interest, and Net Trader Positioning 
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Chart 2.2: USD/CAD - Exchange Rate, Open Interest, and Net Trader Positioning 
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Chart 2.3: USD/CHF - Exchange Rate, Open Interest, and Net Trader Positioning 
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Chart 2.4: EUR/USD - Exchange Rate, Open Interest, and Net Trader Positioning 
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Chart 2.5: GBP/USD - Exchange Rate, Open Interest, and Net Trader Positioning 
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Chart 2.6: USD/JPY - Exchange Rate, Open Interest, and Net Trader Positioning 
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Chart 2.7: USD/MXN - Exchange Rate, Open Interest, and Net Trader Positioning 
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Chart 2.8: NZD/USD - Exchange Rate, Open Interest, and Net Trader Positioning 
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